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INTRODUCTION
The central task of corporate law is to protect minority shareholders.
In public corporations, the problem is referred to as the separation of
ownership and control. Managers, even those who own little stock, can
control public companies for their own benefit rather than striving to
maximize shareholder wealth.' Despite efforts of legislatures, courts, bar
associations, and scholars to reform corporate law, the plight of minority
shareholders persists. Managers of public companies remain free to dis-
dain shareholders, as evidenced by the deep discount from intrinsic value
at which public stocks trade.2 In non-public, or close, corporations the
issue is referred to as the oppression of minority shareholders.3 Close
corporations have no market for their stock, and they rarely pay divi-
dends. Thus, minority shares are frequently worthless to hold and im-
possible to sell. These conditions discourage investment and precipitate
disruptive disputes in small companies.4 This damage is significant be-
cause of the crucial economic role of small companies-for example, in
the 1980s, small companies accounted for two-thirds of all new
employment.
Commentators occasionally predict new market solutions to the mi-
nority investor problem. Over twenty years ago the tender offer was
hailed as the panacea.' However, tender offers are not made for close
corporations or public corporations with concentrated ownership. Even
1. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932).
2. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892 (1988).
3. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1992).
4. See id. §§ 1.03-.04.
5. See Don L. Boroughs, Smart Moyes for Small Business, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
3, 1991, at 52.
6. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965).
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in widely-held companies, tender offers are discouraged by high costs, as
well as by the development and legal approval of potent takeover de-
fenses. Michael Jensen proclaimed that the proliferation of leveraged
buyouts ("LBOs") would cause the "eclipse of the public corporation."7
Jensen considered separation of ownership and control inevitable in pub-
lic companies; therefore, the problem can be avoided only by public firms
"going private" through LBOs. But LBOs, like tender offers, do not af-
fect close corporations, and even in public companies the tide of LBOs
has ebbed.8 Neither tender offers nor LBOs solved the plight of minority
investors.
In the search for solutions, commentators have paid remarkably little
attention to venture capital-to date, no law review articles have ad-
dressed the topic. A venture capitalist supplies equity financing, but does
not assume control of the enterprise. A venture capitalist protects his
investment through contracts. This provides a model for protecting mi-
nority investors in close corporations. Moreover, a venture capitalist's
ability to supply major equity funding revives Jensen's suggestion that
private financing could eclipse the public corporation.
After discussing general venture capital principles, this Article ana-
lyzes how venture capitalists protect themselves against the managerial
opportunism that plagues other passive investors. The Article then
shows that venture capital, though not the long-sought panacea for mi-
nority shareholders, offers valuable lessons for both close and public cor-
porations. Finally, the Article demonstrates that venture capital
confirms Jensen's insight into the strength of private equity financing;
thus, venture capital has the potential to transform corporate finance. To
fully realize this potential, however, the law must change to better ac-
commodate minority investors.
I. WHAT AND WHY IS VENTURE CAPITAL?
Venture capital is a substantial equity investment in a non-public en-
terprise that does not involve active control of the firm.9 It is often asso-
7. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at
61.
x See Christopher Donnelly, M&A Loan Volume Drops by 64% in 1990, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 21, 1991, at 3; Aaron Pressman, Merger Volume is Down, but Bigger Slide is
Coining, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 15, 1990, at 21, 22 ("lack of leveraged buyouts").
9 This Article will refer to a corporation in which a venture capitalist has invested (often
called a "portfolio company") as the "company" or the "firm."
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ciated with the financing of high technology start-up companies, where it
has achieved its most spectacular successes. But, many companies fi-
nanced with venture capital are neither high technology nor start-up
companies. Indeed, companies past the start-up stage often raise addi-
tional venture capital when they are unable to finance through more con-
ventional sources. These later round financings are often called "second
tier," or "mezzanine" financings.1° Furthermore, once-successful com-
panies that have fallen on hard times may also obtain financing from
venture capitalists; these investors are often called "angels."
Entrepreneurs usually seek venture capital when they need capital but
are unable to raise it elsewhere. Retained earnings are a manager's favor-
ite source of funding. However, this source of funding is unavailable for
start-up companies since they have not yet produced earnings to retain;
and even after the start-up, a growing company usually requires more
capital than its cash flow provides. Debt is often the managers' second
choice for capital. Debt financing is generally preferred over equity be-
cause equity investors demand a higher return on their investment than
lenders. Moreover, sales -of stock dilute managers' equity interest and
voting power. However, loans are unavailable to most start-up and
growth companies because of the high risk of loss. In theory, lenders can
offset increased risk by charging a high interest rate. In practice, how-
ever, usury laws, as well as regulations that require institutional lenders
(such as banks and insurance companies) to be conservative, preclude
such high interest loans. Moreover, few start-up companies generate suf-
ficient cash flow to service high interest charges. For these companies
such a loan would rapidly lead to insolvency. 1 Even more established
firms may need more capital than they can borrow.
Some companies avoid debt financing even when loans are available.
The risk of insolvency frightens owner-managers since insolvency will
render their stock worthless and eliminate their jobs. Lenders may re-
10. Commentators use various terms for the stages of a corporation's life. One commentator
identified the stages as seed, start-up, early development, expansion, profitable but cash poor, rapid
growth toward liquidity, mezzanine, and liquidity. See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and
Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FiN. ECON. 473, 479 (1990). This taxonomy is
useful, although somewhat artificial. Corporations may need financing several times while in a single
stage; a corporation may not need any financing at all in some stages. In addition, many venture
capital-financed companies fail before they reach liquidity.
1I. A company could structure a debt financing to postpone the payment of interest, but then
the loan would in substance be equity. A court would probably classify it as equity in bankruptcy.
See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
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quire personal loan guarantees, which managers often refuse to give. 12
Furthermore, lenders may demand covenants that restrict managerial
control.13 Default on these covenants, even while a company is solvent,
enables the lender to intrude more deeply into managing the firm. Even
if default is avoided, high interest payments may stunt a company's
growth.
The third financing alternative is a public sale of company stock.
Although stock sales dilute managers' equity interest, their loss of con-
trol is limited if the stock is sold publicly. Even if a firm sells a majority
of its stock to the public, managers can retain control through the proxy
mechanism.' 4 Public offerings usually generate a higher stock price than
private placements. 15 For most start-up companies, however, a public
offering is not an alternative since underwriters and investors will not
buy a stock in an unknown company that has no earnings record. Even
if a public offering is possible, the costs of the offering and of operating as
a public company may be so great 16 that managers prefer a private sale of
stock.
In later round financings, venture capitalists with an equity position in
a company may value the company's equity higher than public investors
based on their superior knowledge of the company. If the two sides have
12. See Richard I. Levin & Virginia R. Travis, Small Company Finance: What the Books Don't
Say, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 30.
13. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
14. Managers may prefer a sale of equity for three reasons. First, the sale of equity may restrict
managerial discretion less than the restrictive covenants demanded by lenders. Second, a public sale
of stock permits managers to sell some of their own stock, because an initial public offering usually
leads to the creation of a trading market in which such stock can be sold. Finally, managers may
also favor equity financing if they are less optimistic than the market about the company's future,
and therefore consider equity cheaper than debt.
15. See William J. Torpey & Jerry A. Viscione, Mezzanine Money for Smaller Businesses,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1987, at 116-17. "If a company could get a multiple of ten times
earnings with an initial public offering (IPO), it might get only six times earnings from a private issue
.... .Id. This estimate is somewhat misleading. In a public offering the underwriter investigates
the company. The underwriter incorporates this investigation cost into its compensation, which is
then deducted from the public selling price; the company receives only the net. If one compares the
net proceeds from public offerings (as opposed to the gross selling price) to private offerings, the
price differential is considerably reduced. The remaining difference is explained largely by the
greater liquidity and diversity that investors in public companies enjoy. See infra notes 20-23.
16 See Jeffry A. Timmons & Dale A. Sander, Everything You (Don't) Want to Know About
Raising Capital, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 70, 71. According to Timmons and Sander,
costs "can run 15% to 20% of a smaller offering and can go as high as 35% in some instances." Id.
Post-offering expenses "often add up to $100,000 a year or more." Id.
1992] 1033
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amicable relations, the managers' fear of losing control to the venture
capitalist diminishes and may be outweighed by a desire for the lower
transaction and maintenance costs and higher stock price of a private
equity sale.
Because venture capital financing dilutes managers' equity interest and
control, it is often the last choice of financing. When venture capital is
the only method of raising capital available, however, it is often eagerly
sought. 7 Therefore, most companies that seek venture capital are unsta-
ble and risky. In fact, one-third of venture capital-financed companies
wind up in bankruptcy. Another one-third end up in "limbo" or as "liv-
ing dead"-limping along, able to pay expenses (including managers' sal-
aries), but unable to go public or pay significant dividends."8 Only one-
third of the companies that use venture capital financing succeed. Ven-
ture capitalists demand high returns because the successful one-third of
their investments must cover the losses generated by the other two-
thirds, as well as the high transactions costs that venture capitalists pay
in seeking, monitoring, and evaluating their investments.19
Venture capitalists also demand high returns because they cannot re-
duce risks by diversifying. Although modern portfolio theory advises in-
vestors not to put all their eggs in one basket, 20 venture capitalists are
forced to ignore this advice. High transaction costs of choosing, moni-
toring, and evaluating private equity investments limit the venture capi-
talist to a few major purchases rather than many small investments.
Large venture capital firms may receive over 1,000 proposals each year,
but may invest in only a dozen.2' Further, the firm-specific expertise
needed to enter into, and continually monitor, wise investments limits
the investor's range of investment options; therefore, most venture capi-
tal firms concentrate their investments in one industry or a set of indus-
17. See GEORGE KOZMETSKY ET AL., FINANCING AND MANAGING FAST-GROWTH COMPA-
NIES: THE VENTURE CAPITAL PROCESS 1 (1985) (entrepreneurs seek venture capital when they "are
unable to raise capital from conventional sources"). Venture capitalists claim that they often pro-
vide general management advice and useful business connections to portfolio companies, especially
when the company needs further financing or wants to go public. See id. at xiv; Sahlman, supra note
10, at 509. Commentators question these claims. Although venture capitalists have the skill, con-
nections, and possibly the desire to help portfolio companies, in practice they are too busy to devote
sufficient time to be truly helpful.
18. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 483, 511-12.
19. See Venture Capital in the '90s, INC., Feb. 1991, at 31.
20. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 459 (1989).
21. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 475; see also KOZMETSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at 8
(explaining that about two percent of proposals are funded).
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tries.2 2 The result is a less diverse, and consequently more risky,
portfolio.
Illiquidity also requires venture capitalists to demand a higher return
on their investment. The inability of venture capitalists to sell their stock
at a fair price whenever they choose is a burden for which they must be
compensated. Thus, venture capitalists demand higher returns than the
yield typically paid on debt or even on other types of equity
investments.23
II. How VENTURE CAPITALISTS PROTECT THEIR INVESTMENTS
A. Background
Venture capitalists usually obtain a significant voice in the control of
the firm. However, even when this voice includes choosing half or a ma-
jority of the board of directors, it does not ensure fair treatment for the
venture capitalist, who still must face the problem of agency costs. Ven-
ture capitalists demand protective covenants to minimize these costs.
The requisite level of protection influences the choice of security as the
investment vehicle.24 In theory, the parties may give a security any fea-
tures that they desire, regardless of the label they attach to it: "For a
draftsman, the security is whatever he chooses to make it."' 25 However,
in practice, each type of security traditionally includes some features and
not others.26 Altering a security's traditional features invites confusion,
22. See I MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGO-
TIATION 145 (1991) (sample private placement memorandum indicating fund specialization);
KOZMETSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at 3 (venture capital firms often specify their areas of investment
specialization).
23. See Venture Capital in the '90s, supra note 19, at 31. There may be another reason: the
small supply of venture capital. Until recently this contributed to high investment returns. Because
of the small supply of venture capital, venture capitalists could choose to invest only in firms that
promised high returns. Firms that would not or could not make such promises could not obtain
venture capital financing. The growing supply of venture capital has forced down these returns. See
Allan Myerson, Venture Capital Funds on Upswing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at C1 (influx of
venture capital in late 1980s forced down returns).
24. The enterprise must also decide under which business form it will operate-i.e., general
partnership, limited liartnership, S corporation, or a regular C corporation. Tax considerations
largely dictate this decision, not the financial contracting issues which are the focus of this Article.
Most firms with substantial venture capital financing choose to incorporate. Accordingly, this Arti-
cle focuses almost exclusively on the corporate form.
25. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 1108 (5th ed. unabridged 1980).
26. For example,
both common and preferred [stock] have ownership rights. The preferred normally is lim-
10351992]
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disputes about interpretation, and even accusations of deception. Thus,
venture capitalists commonly use traditional securities that contain the
desired features rather than creating unconventional securities. Many
venture capital securities contain covenants that are common to close
corporations. This Article will briefly examine these familiar covenants
and will more closely analyze agreements that are distinctive to venture
capital.27
Each party to an economic transaction attempts to maximize its
wealth; when all parties so behave, the result is an effort to maximize
their joint wealth. However, caveats must be noted. A covenant may
result from the parties' mistaken belief that it will increase their joint
wealth, or from one party's superior bargaining power. In addition, con-
tracts evolve toward greater efficiency; standard contract terms at any
given time are imperfect and are continually evolving. Nonetheless, stan-
dard terms in any field, including venture capital, "take their current
form and have survived because they represent a contractual solution
which is efficient." '28
Although contracts are quite standardized in many areas,29 the varied
business contexts of venture capital discourage uniformity. For example,
an investor who has the power to choose a majority of the board of direc-
tors, has needs far different from an investor who lacks even a veto power
over the board's decisions. The variety of terms in venture capital con-
tracts also mirrors the diverse preferences of the parties involved. Ven-
ture capitalists range from pension funds and other huge financial
institutions to individual investors of modest means. In addition, manag-
ers have varied preferences, such as differing levels of risk aversion. An-
other factor is the parties' level of sophistication. Unusual terms may
reflect either mutual ignorance or overreaching by a more sophisticated
party.3" The youth of the venture capital industry is another reason for
ited to a fixed dividend but has prior claim on dividends and, in the event of liquidation,
assets. Claims of both common and preferred stockholders are junior to claims of bond-
holders or other creditors of the company. Common stockholders assume the greater risk,
but generally exercise the greater control and may gain the greater reward in the form of
dividends and capital appreciation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (6th ed. 1990).
27. For example, arbitration agreements commonly appear in other close corporations as well
as in firms with venture capital investors. Because such agreements are not distinctive to venture
capital arrangements, this Article will not discuss them.
28. Smith & Warner, supra note 13, at 123 (referring to bond covenants).
29. See id. at 122-23 (discussing the high level of standardization in bond covenants).
30. Although managers may be experts in production or marketing, they often know much less
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/2
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the multiformity of contractual terms. Participants learn from experi-
ence which contract terms are efficient, but evolution by survival of the
fittest takes time. Moreover, due to the diverse uses of venture capital,
covenants will not evolve toward perfect uniformity. More likely, the
venture capital field will evolve into several categories of deals, with con-
tract terms varying among the categories, but becoming more standard-
ized within each category.
This Article will attempt to explain how venture capital covenants are
utilized to maximize the parties' mutual wealth. Economic advantage to
just one party does not justify a covenant term. If a term does not maxi-
mize the mutual wealth of the parties, a term that would do so should
have been used and the benefits of the entire agreement adjusted to make
the deal Pareto superior.3 1 Nor does superior bargaining power of one
party explain a covenant term; it must be determined why a party
chooses to exert its superior bargaining power to extract one concession
rather than another. Why, for example, does a venture capitalist bargain
for a restrictive covenant rather than for a larger share of equity? To
answer this question, the Article uses both inductive economic analysis
and empirical evidence. This Article initiates an analysis of venture capi-
tal and serves as a starting point for future research in the area.
B. Protection Without Covenants-Participation in Control, Financial
Arrangements, and their Limitations
Contract covenants are not the only form of protection for venture
capitalists. Although they often deny a desire to interfere with the con-
trol of a company,32 venture capitalists generally demand a voice in con-
about financial contracting than the venture capitalists. A knowledgeable lawyer can even the bal-
ance, but many managers are not even sophisticated enough to retain such lawyers.
3 1. One situation is Pareto superior to another if in the former at least one party is better off and
no party is worse off than in the latter. A situation is Pareto optimal if there is no other situation in
which any of the participants would fare better and no participant would be worse off. See A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983).
32. See KOZMETSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at xii; Gilbert Kennedy, Packaging the Deal, in
How To RAISE AND INVEST VENTURE CAPITAL 85, 94 (Stanley M. Rubel & Edward G. Novotny
eds., 1971) ("Generally, a venture capital investor is not looking for a leading role in the operating
management .. "). The venture capitalist's disclaimer of control is conditional. If a company
steadily expands and its managers do not harm the company or its investors, the capitalist gladly
leaves control to the managers. If the company falters, however, the venture capitalist often becomes
more active. If severe problems arise (as they often do-see infra note 40), the investors may at-
tempt to liquidate the company or replace its managers. Managers' fear of this possibility is a major
reason why they avoid venture capital financing when possible. See Jill Andresky, I'd Rather Go
Bankrupt, FORBES, June 17, 1985, at 142.
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trol. This voice may include the power to elect one-half of the board of
directors"3 or a minority of directors sufficient to veto major board
actions.34
Despite the protection afforded by controlling one-half or more of a
board of directors, investors still need restrictive covenants. First,
although by electing one-half of the directors an investor can block un-
wanted board action, the investor cannot institute action over the opposi-
tion of the other half of the board. If a corporation's charter requires a
supermajority vote, even an investor majority on the board may lack
working control. Second, if the board develops a voting deadlock, com-
promise between the investor and management is possible, but not inevi-
table. Since managers control the day-to-day business, board deadlock
may leave them free to run the firm3" with their compensation intact.
Therefore, the burdens of board deadlock weigh more heavily against
investors. To avert deadlock, managers and investors may agree to equal
board representation and the joint selection of a neutral director.36 This
33. The power to elect directors entails voting, which is usually tied to ownership of common
stock. Venture capitalists often purchase preferred stock that is convertible into common stock and
carries votes equal in number to the common shares into which it is convertible. See I HALLORAN
ET AL., supra note 22, at 354-55. If there are several investors, they may contract to vote as a class
to elect directors. Id. at 355. Some state statutes permit debt holders to contract for voting rights.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1991). Venture capitalists obtain the power to elect half the
board in several ways: (1) management may directly stipulate such power; (2) shareholders may
enter into a pooling agreement; or (3) management may give the investors the same number of votes
as the managers.
The percentage of the board of directors that investors have the power to elect varies widely in
venture capital deals. A study of initial public offerings ("IPOs") by venture capital-financed firms
shows that on average venture capitalists held 34.3% of the pre-IPO equity and 33.4% of the board
seats. See Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Compa-
nies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 461 (1990). These percentages are undoubtedly higher in other venture
capital-financed companies because IPO companies are not start-ups, but have matured to the point
of making a public offering. The percentage of board seats held may be especially misleading be-
cause underwriters often insist that companies add unaffiliated directors (excluding venture capital-
ists) to the board before conducting an IPO.
34. See Harold M. Hoffman & James Blakey, You Can Negotiate With Venture Capitalists,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 16, 22. A board veto is often arranged by giving the investor
a substantial minority (for example, 40%) of the directors and requiring a supermajority vote (for
example, 67%) to approve major actions as defined in the charter. Even in public companies, a
board veto is sometimes given to major equity investors. See Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P.
Sheehan, Monitoring an Owner: The Case of Turner Broadcasting, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 336-38
(1991).
35. See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 133 (III. 1960) (where two
factions on the board of directors were equally divided, causing deadlock, the president ran the
company unhindered for over 10 years).
36. See, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1966) (company controlled by fami-
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arrangement, however, may cause the investor to be outvoted, perhaps
repeatedly, if the neutral director sides with management. 37
If several investors have board representation, none will have a major-
ity on the board. Investors generally cooperate since their interests coin-
cide. But, occasionally their interests may diverge, or they may simply
disagree on a course of action. In addition, some investors may conspire
with managers to exploit other investors. Even an investor who initially
controlled one-half the board may lose his veto power over board actions
due to death, illness, disability, or disloyalty of a director. Protective
covenants assume importance in each of these situations.
If selecting one-half of the board of directors does not adequately pro-
tect investors, why do they resort to protective covenants rather than
insisting on even greater board representation? Corporate control carries
burdens as well as benefits. For example, "controlling persons" may in-
cur liability to third parties and are subject to strict fiduciary duties to
the other shareholders.3" Moreover, certain financial institutions are le-
gally barred from controlling the firms in which they invest.
Investors may be able to select a majority of the board's directors
under an "event of election" clause. Yet, these clauses apply only if the
corporation defaults on its obligations to the investor or fails to achieve
certain goals.39 Logically, a venture capitalist will not invest in a com-
pany unless he values the company's managers. If the company performs
to the investor's satisfaction, the investor will not interfere with manage-
ment. If the company fails to perform, however, the investor may as-
sume that management is at fault. Moreover, when a company falters,
the balance of risks and burdens between managers and investors shifts.
Managers may avoid risk and allow the company to limp along as long as
lies with equal shares of voting stock established a neutral directorship to obviate the risk of
deadlock).
37. See id. at 804 (neutral director repeatedly sided with one of the two owner families).
38. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 653-56 (3d ed.
1983) (fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on
Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 9-21 (1990) (legal restrictions on
investments by financial institutions); Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988) (liability
of controlling persons for securities law violations by controlled company); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (same).
39 For example, investors often receive the power to elect a board majority if the corporation
misses too many dividend payments on the investors' preferred stock or if it fails to make a public
stock offering by a certain date. Such arrangements are called "voting switch provisions," see I
HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 359, or "event-of-election" clauses, see Andresky, supra note
1992] 1039
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the firm continues to pay them more than they could earn elsewhere.
Investors, though, abhor this state of limbo in which the company is able
to pay its bills but cannot pay dividends or go public. Therefore, inves-
tors may prefer to take risks that managers would avoid.
On the other hand, if the company is on the verge of insolvency, the
views of risk may change.4' Investors often have a liquidation prefer-
ence,41 so managers risk losing their jobs and their equity interests in case
of insolvency. Therefore, managers may decide to usurp firm assets or
take desperate actions. They will benefit if their efforts succeed but will
not suffer if the risks fail; in effect, they are playing with the investors'
money. A venture capitalist may attempt to avoid this problem by re-
serving the power to seize control of the board when the company en-
counters financial difficulties.
Even investors who control a board may still want restrictive cove-
nants because replacing managers is difficult and costly. For example,
investors may be unable to remove managers because they have employ-
ment contracts or because better managers are not affordable or
available.42
This discussion also explains why venture capitalists generally secure
protective covenants instead of seeking a majority of the company's eq-
uity. Investors who control the board could exploit management. The
threat of oppression by investors is more serious than the risk of manag-
ers oppressing investors because managers have their jobs as well as their
own investment money at stake; unlike investors, managers bear the risk
of being fired, or having their compensation, perquisites or authority re-
duced. By allotting managers substantial equity in the firm, investors
discourage managerial opportunism and slack. In addition, it encourages
diligence on the job because managers have an equity interest in the suc-
40. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcON. 147 (1977) (a
party with a contingent claim on value has an incentive to increase risk).
41. See infra note 65.
42. Some corporate actions (such as mergers) require shareholder approval, often by a
supermajority, and cannot be taken by the board alone. Some actions, such as selling shares back to
the corporation, are forbidden as self-dealing if the investor controls the board and treats itself differ-
ently from other shareholders. Consequently, board representation alone may not enable an investor
to take certain steps. These actions may be taken only if (or more safely it) the investor has a
contractual right to take them.
Although firing managers may be difficult, even when the venture capitalist controls the board, it
is sometimes done. See Phyllis Berman, The Unacceptable Face of Venture Capitalists, FORBES,
June 2, 1986, at 106. Berman's article also demonstrates the strong allure of venture capital; tile
ousted executive soon started another company which he also financed with venture capital.
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cess of the firm. As the managers' share of equity is reduced, the incen-
tive weakens, and the divergence between the managers' interests and the
investors' interests grows, as often happens in public companies.43 Thus,
it is unwise to give the managers an equal voice on the board if they own
a minority of the firm's equity. This would merely increase the manag-
ers' power of day-to-day control without aligning the managers' and in-
vestors' goals.44
Although venture capitalists traditionally rejected minority status on
the board, many now accept it45 when the company is better established
and less risky than a start-up company. In such cases the managers have
other sources of capital and do not need to cede half the board to outside
investors. Investors must devote special attention to contract terms
when they have little voice in control. An investment that contains a
debt component may benefit both the investors and management.46 The
right to interest payments and the general creditor's fights that attach to
debt assure investors steady payouts and protect them against freezeouts.
To assure additional protection in a debt security, investors can negotiate
for the right to seize control if management fails to meet certain financial
goals.47 These deals usually include an "equity kicker" (the ability to
increase the investor's equity position at a reduced price).4 8
Why do companies finance in this manner rather than using straight
debt? Though more stable than start-ups, these companies are generally
too risky to borrow from banks. Furthermore, without an equity kicker,
a lender might charge a higher interest rate than the company's cash flow
can cover. By financing primarily with debt, however, managers reduce
the equity dilution and the loss of control that they suffer with more
43. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corpora-
tion, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881, 889-91 (interests of managers and shareholders in public companies
often diverge).
44. Companies also use dual class stock (different classes of stock with disparate voting rights)
in other contexts to produce different allocations of voting power and interest in profits. See George
W. Dent, Jr., Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725
(1986),
45. Increasing competition among venture capitalists has contributed to the new attitude. See
Robert A Mamis, Cashing In Without Cashing Out, INC., Sept. 1987, at 113. Moreover, improved
protection through covenants has made equal board representation less important. Finally, an inves-
tor who accepts minority status on the board may avoid the disadvantages of being a control person.
See supra note 38.
46 See Mamis, supra note 45, at 113; Torpey & Viscione, supra note 15, at 117.
47 See Mamis, supra note 45, at 113; Torpey & Viscione, supra note 15, at 117.
48, "Equity kickers" include warrants to purchase common stock at less than fair market price.
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conventional venture capital financing.49 A combination of debt with an
equity kicker benefits management (lower cost of capital and less equity
dilution) while protecting investors (assured interest payments, creditor's
rights, and the right to acquire a strong equity position at a low cost).
These transactions illustrate the benefits of convertible debt securities.
Some scholars argue that the combination of disparate elements in these
securities (i.e., debt and equity) makes no more economic sense than
packaging apples and oranges together.50 Sometimes, though, converti-
ble debt modulates risk and payouts better than either straight debt or
straight equity. As noted, minority shareholders fear that a company
will limp cautiously along, paying the managers generous compensation
while providing no return to the investors. On the other hand, a creditor
faces the opposite risk: if a company approaches insolvency, the manag-
ers may engage in reckless behavior at the creditor's expense. Converti-
ble debt addresses both these risks. First, it deters managers from
struggling along in limbo by forcing them to make periodic interest pay-
ments. Second, it discourages management from taking imprudent risks,
because if the effort fails, the security holder will have the priority of a
creditor in bankruptcy. Yet, if an effort succeeds, the holder will convert
to equity and share the profits.
Similarly, convertible debt may offer a payout policy superior to either
straight debt or straight equity. Straight debt financing works well for
companies with sufficient cash flow to cover both interest and growth
opportunities. If cash flow falters even briefly, however, growth may be
stunted or, worse, the company may default on its debt. On the other
hand, straight equity financing is attractive to companies that are not
prosperous. But, if a firm's fortunes improve, management may find the
investors' share of the profits a heavy price to pay for the capital that the
investors contributed. For investors, the considerations are the oppo-
site-it is better to hold debt securities when the company languishes and
equity is preferred when the company flourishes. Convertible debt may
provide a golden means of financing for the two sides by imposing a mod-
erate burden on the managers, in both good and bad times.5
49. See Torpey & Viscione, supra note 15, at 117 (both investor and company profit from these
transactions).
50. See William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 547,
553 (1975).
51. Similar effects may be achieved by issuing a combination of straight debt and straight eq-
uity. With both types of investments outstanding, managers would have less incentive for the oppor-
tunism described above. Convertible debt, however, offers certain advantages. First, a convertible
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Investors must also consider how future corporate financing will affect
their control. A new issuance of stock may reduce or eliminate an inves-
tor's board representation. 2  The investor can avoid this problem
through cumulative voting or a pooling agreement that entitles it to elect
a portion of the board. Staged financing also helps to protect prior inves-
tors. A venture capitalist typically provides capital to sustain a company
only for a brief time." Long-term financing is not feasible because it is
impossible to specify by contract when to abandon the firm and return
the unused capital to the investors. 4 Staged financing also provides the
initial investor an advantage when a company needs more money since
that investor's knowledge of the company makes it the most logical
source of additional financing. Other investors may be wary, reasoning
that the company must be in shaky condition if the original investor will
not furnish additional capital.
Combining staged financing with restrictive covenants can provide an
investor undue power over future financings. With enough board votes,
the investor can simply veto stock sales to new investors. Short of a veto,
debt investment requires only one set of negotiations, often with an investor who is familiar with the
company, rather than two sets of negotiation, one at least with a stranger to the company. Transac-
tion costs might escalate if the two deals were interdependent and had to be negotiated simultane-
ously. For example, the interest rate on the debt could depend on the stock issuance, and the terms
of the stock sale could depend on how much the company borrows. Second, the high interest rate
charged to risky companies could preclude lenders who are required by law to be cautious. See
supra text preceding note 1I. Pursuing other types of lenders would further raise transaction costs.
Third, straight borrowing could violate covenants with an existing investor. A company could avoid
this problem by negotiating a convertible debt package with the same investor. Fourth, and most
importantly, managers can conspire with the other shareholders against the holders of straight debt
in ways that they cannot with holders of convertible debt. If a firm's fortunes wane, both managers
and outside shareholders would have an incentive to approve high-risk projects. Holders of straight
debt would share losses if the projects fail, but, because they a have fixed rate of return, they would
not share the gains if projects succeed. If, by contract, straight debt holders could veto such high-
risk projects (either through a covenant or voting rights), they could also veto those projects with a
positive net present value-projects that a convertible debt holder would have approved. In short,
convertible debt better aligns the interests of the managers and the investors.
52. In most states, a simple majority of the shares outstanding can elect the entire board unless
the corporate charter permits cumulative voting. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212, 216
(1991) The initial investor can maintain its power by purchasing a percentage of shares in the new
issue equal to or greater than its current ownership percentage. Even if the initial investor has the
right to make such a purchase at a fair price, however, it may waive that right to avoid concentrating
it-, investments in one company.
53 See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 475.
54 Managers prefer not to liquidate an enterprise as long as capital remains, regardless of a
dismal business outlook. Using an independent arbitrator to decide if a company should liquidate is
inappropriate and unnecessary: the market will decide. If a firm shows promise, investors will con-
tinue to provide financing.
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an investor that is entitled to choose a portion of the board can refuse to
reduce its representation. The new investors must then either forego rep-
resentation on the board or take board positions from the managers."5
The original investor may also refuse to modify its right to convert to a
given percentage of common stock, thus making further financing im-
practical. The ability to disrupt new financing may enable an initial in-
vestor to snap up subsequent stock issuances at bargain prices.
"As a result, managers have strong incentives to keep the original inves-
tor satisfied.56 Venture capitalists and managers have a long-term, rela-
tional contract in which the need to cooperate for mutual advantage
often restrains parties from fully pressing their contract rights." Thus,
the importance of contract terms in venture capital deals should not be
overstated. On the other hand, when a company falters, cooperation
may cease and conflict may erupt, causing contract rights to become cru-
cial. Moreover, even in prosperity, contracts often dictate the terms of
cooperation. For example, in a successful firm, dividend rights will be
observed, or at least provide the basis for renegotiation, rather than be
utterly ignored. In summary, the importance of contract terms should
not be understated.
C. Protective Covenants
1. A Taxonomy of Venture Capital Covenants
Covenants in venture capital investments are best classified according
to the problems that they are designed to solve. These problems include:
(1) illiquidity (holding shares that cannot be sold and receive no
payouts); (2) excessive compensation and other self-dealing by managers;
(3) dilution of the investor's equity interest resulting from new issues of
shares; (4) abuse of corporate opportunities and information and compet-
ing with the firm; (5) undesirable transfers of the managers' shares; (6)
lack of information; and (7) insolvency. Covenants should also be ana-
lyzed for features that minimize undue burdens on the company.
Although the following section is organized according to the preceding
55. The same problem arises if, by a pooling agreement, the managers give the initial investor
the power to elect half the board.
56. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 506-07.
57. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1089 (1981). Appreciating the need to cooperate, parties may not specify how they will
resolve certain problems, but may instead decide to work them out when and if they arise. Id. at
1090.
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taxonomy, protective devices can also be categorized in other ways. Wil-
liam Klein classified them into rules that directly limit a party's behavior
(i.e., restrictive covenants), participation in control, and aligning of in-
vestors' and managers' interests.58 Rules that permit a party to exit
should be added to the list-a party can often deter or escape another's
opportunism by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw its capital con-
tribution.5 9 The power to exit is often achieved by requiring the corpora-
tion to repurchase the venture capitalist's stock.6" This Article
previously discussed participation in control and aligning of the parties'
interests, so most of the following discussion focuses on direct limits on
party action and exit and on the interplay among all four approaches.
2. Illiquidity and Payouts
Being "locked in"-having an investment that receives no payouts and
cannot be sold-is perhaps the largest problem for minority investors in
close corporations. Even when managers act in good faith, close corpo-
rations rarely pay dividends because dividends incur double taxation; the
company is taxed when it earns the income and investors are taxed when
they receive dividends from the residue.61 Every effort is made to chan-
nel income from the firm to the entrepreneurs in ways other than divi-
dends, such as management compensation.6" This is effective for
manager-investors, but not for investors who are not part of manage-
ment. Nonmanagement investors can assure payouts by mandating divi-
dend payments whenever the firm meets certain financial tests or by tying
dividends to management compensation. Alternatively, investors can ac-
quire debt instruments, which avoid double taxation because interest is
deductible by the corporation as a business expense. 63 Hence, most pri-
vate financings of established corporations employ debt instruments.
These measures are not feasible for most companies financed with ven-
ture capital because they lack sufficient cash flow or stability to promise
58. William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALE L.J. 1521, 1556 n.126 (1982).
59. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1981).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 72-80.
61 Corporations are taxed once based on their profits. I.R.C. § 11 (1988). Then, shareholders
are taxed a second time on dividends received from the corporation. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1988).
62. See HAMILTON, supra note 20, at 373.
63. I.R.C. § 163 (1988).
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regular dividends or interest payments.64 Sometimes, however, preferred
stock dividends are cumulative-missed dividends must be paid before
further dividends are paid to the common stockholders.6 5 When the in-
vestor is a corporation, the double tax burden from paying stock divi-
dends is eased by the exclusion of most dividend income from the
corporate investor's taxable income.66
Close corporation shares are illiquid since, by definition, no market
exists for them. The managers' stock is similarly unmarketable; there-
fore, managers share the investor's incentive to go public. 67 Managers
are more ambivalent, though, because going public entails substantial
costs and disclosure obligations. More importantly, the sale of additional
stock may weaken their control.68 If hopes for going public fade, the
interests of investors and managers further diverge. As long as the man-
agers are paid more than they could earn elsewhere,69 they will oppose
dissolution. Investors, however, abhor a state of limbo, since they receive
no return on their investment. Indeed, investors view limbo, which is a
common fate for venture capital financed firms,7" as worse than insol-
vency and dissolution. At least an investor can take a tax loss for stock
that becomes worthless; he has no such recourse for stock of companies
in limbo.7
1
64. See supra text accompanying note I1. See also I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 334
(preferred stock issued by venture capital enterprises is rarely entitled to mandatory dividends be-
cause venture capital-financed firms "are rarely in a position to pay dividends").
65. See 2 ROBERT J. HAFT, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING 211-88 to
2B-89 (rev. ed. 1991). Sometimes preferred stock dividends are either not cumulative, or cumulative
only if earned--"i.e., to the extent that the profits earned in the relevant fiscal period were sufficient
to pay dividends." I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 335.
66. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) permits corporations to deduct 70% of the dividends they receive from
their taxable income. The deduction increases to 100% if the corporation owns more than 80% of
the payor's stock. I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(3), 1504(a) (1988).
67. However, managers and venture capitalists usually do not sell most of their stock in an
IPO. Indeed, venture capitalists generally sell none of their stock. See Barry et al., supra note 33, at
460. After a company goes public though, the shareholders can more readily sell their stock. Ven-
ture capitalists sell an average of 30% of their shares within one year after an IPO. See id.
68. Stock exchange rules that require listed companies to include several outside directors on
their boards may constrain managerial control. See 2A HAF, supra note 65, at 5A-48.
69. This does not imply that the managers are overpaid. Managers' skills become more firm-
specific the longer they work for a firm. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15-23 (1986). Since the managers' value to other
firms is lower, due to firm-specific skills, they hesitate to dissolve their current employer.
70. See supra note 18.
71. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1988) (permitting deduction for "any loss sustained").
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a. Puts or Mandatory Redemptions
To avoid limbo, venture capitalists often obtain a right (dubbed a
mandatory redemption, a put, or a buyout) to sell their stock back to the
corporation after a specified time lapses, unless the company goes pub-
lic. 72 The redemption price is typically the original purchase price plus a
reasonable rate of interest. Preferred stock that fails to receive dividend
payments, but which contains such a right, resembles a zero coupon
bond because interest is paid only when the security matures.
Mandatory redemptions enable investors to sell an investment which is
in limbo and which would otherwise be illiquid. They also discipline
managers. Although limbo may result from market conditions beyond
managerial control, it can also result from managerial misconduct which
is hard to detect and which may not violate fiduciary law or protective
covenants. 73 Managers may be lazy or incompetent-shortcomings that
a contract cannot directly prohibit. Investors and managers may also
disagree over the appropriate level of risk taking. Because venture capi-
talists spread risk over several investments, they are risk-neutral: they
favor all actions that, discounted for risk, increase the net present value
of the firm. Managers, on the other hand, are more risk averse because
more of their wealth-both stock and employment-is invested in the
firm. 74  Redemption rights do not address the problems of managerial
incompetence or risk-aversion, but they do provide investors the remedy
of exit when the problems occur. Thus, redemption rights resemble
72. A corporation may allow each investor to individually decide whether to exercise a
mandatory redemption right. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 348 (form of mandatory
redemption); Stanley Keller, Venture Capital Financing Documents, REPRESENTING THE GROWING
TECHNOLOGY COMPANY (I ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dallas, Tex.), Oct. 25-26, 1990, at 307, 347-
49 (semble); Jack L. Lewis & Thomas C. Dabney, Certificate of Incorporation for a Delaware Corpo-
ration with a Venture Capital Investor Purchasing Preferred Stock, REPRESENTING THE GROWING
TECHNOLOGY COMPANY (I ALI-ABA Course of Study, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 19-20, 1989, at 29,
42-43 (semble). Alternatively, a corporation may require the holders of a specified portion of the
securities to approve a mandatory redemption, in which case the corporation must redeem all of the
securities. See Robert Reffner, Legal Considerations in Venture Capital Financing, Speech at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (Apr. 22, 1988) (transcript on file with author) (form of
mandatory redemption). The latter approach prevents investors with a small quantity of securities
from carrying burdensome special privileges. A company can waive the requirement that it redeem
the entire class of securities.
Redemption rights typically expire if the company goes public. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra
note 22, at 481-82.
73. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357,
380-83 (1987) (buyout rights counter managerial exploitation).
74. See Coffee, supra note 69, at 15-23.
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event-of-election clauses, which give investors the remedy of seizing con-
trol when management falters.
Practical considerations, however, limit the value of redemption rights
for an investor. In fact, investors almost never exercise them. Yet, they
are still useful. First, by not exercising the redemption right the venture
capitalist protects his reputation. If the investor is too aggressive with
managers, he may lose attractive deals to friendlier investors. Second, if
the company is in poor financial condition, the right of redemption can-
not be exercised because only current profits or surplus earnings can fund
stock redemptions." Redemption rights are often tied to event-of-elec-
tion clauses, though, so that if the company cannot redeem, the investors
can seize control from the managers. Third, an investor may waive its
right to redeem in exchange for additional securities or contract rights.
An investor may also accept a lesser payout than the stated redemption
price if it cannot realistically enforce the put at its full price. Managers
will pay an investor some amount in order to maintain control.
On the other hand, if a firm prospers and the stock's value exceeds the
buyout price, an investor should waive its redemption rights.76 Further-
more, a company that satisfies the state law on redemptions does not
necessarily have cash to effect the redemption. An investor is reluctant
to injure itself by exercising a Tedemption that could trigger a financial
crisis or force the company into bankruptcy. Still, even stock in a suc-
cessful firm has a discounted value if it is illiquid. Furthermore, where
redemption might injure the investor, it will most likely harm the manag-
ers more severely, so that management cannot ignore the investor's
threat to exercise. In short, a right of redemption pressures managers to
satisfy investors. For example, if the company has prospered, a public
offering may be possible. Ordinarily, managers may resist a public offer-
ing even when feasible; 77 however, the threat of a mandatory redemption
makes them more amenable. Alternatively, the obligation may induce
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 160 (1991). Restrictive covenants in debt instruments
may also preclude a company from satisfying a mandatory redemption.
76. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 346-48 (discussion of and form for waiver of
redemption right). Some agreements forbid the investor to waive redemption; then, the investor can
avoid the redemption only by converting to common stock. Nonwaivable redemptions force inves-
tors to surrender the protective covenants and the other privileges that they initially bargained for
and to choose between cash redemption and the lesser rights of a common stockholder. Ifa corpora-
tion flourishes, the value of the common stock makes conversion more attractive. A right to waive
redemption gives an investor more time to decide whether to convert.
77. See supra text preceding note 14 (public offerings dilute managers' equity interest and
control).
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the managers either to find another investor to fund the buyout or to
start paying dividends. 78
Whether redemption rights are included in a venture capital transac-
tion depends in part on the parties' bargaining skills. Venture capitalists
are often better counseled and more sophisticated than managers. Man-
agers are often overly optimistic and may grant redemption rights with-
out appreciating the probability or the magnitude of the trouble they may
create. The threat of a cash drain caused by a forced redemption may
deter future investors from participating, and thus further tighten the
initial investor's grip over later financings.79 By exercising a right of re-
demption, an investor signals dissatisfaction which scares off other poten-
tial investors. Another reason why redemption clauses are omitted from
some transactions is that they are difficult to draft without inviting op-
portunism. For example, requiring long notice periods before an investor
can exercise his right of redemption not only permits managers to find
substitute financing, but it also enables them to loot the company. A
redemption right could be made exercisable only if the company fails
certain financial tests. However, these tests may be hard to specify, and a
company that fails such tests may be legally barred from redeeming
stock.
Even sophisticated managers often allow rights of redemption in ven-
ture capital arrangements, presumably because they are an efficient solu-
tion to some problems. It is unclear, though, why redemption rights may
be efficient solutions only in certain cases. Perhaps they are best used for
companies that are especially likely to wind up in corporate limbo. It is
also probable that, given both their benefits and their costs, a redemption
right is a fairly neutral feature which does not materially enhance or im-
pair most deals. The net benefits of a redemption clause may be so slight
that parties often forego it as not worth its transaction costs.80
b. Facilitating Resales
Some covenants are designed to facilitate the resale of an investor's
interest, including the right to have the stock registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") for public sale. The extent of
78. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 345 (a put "pressures the company to find
another path to liquidity for the investors").
79. See id. at 346; see also supra text accompanying note 55 (initial investor's influence over
later financings).
80. See Ribstein, supra note 73 (discussing the costs and benefits of buyouts in partnerships).
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these rights varies. "Piggy-back" rights entitle the investor to include its
stock in the company's public offerings."1 "Demand" rights go further
by allowing an investor to compel the company to register the investor's
stock with the SEC, at least if the company meets certain financial
tests.8 2 However, even demand rights do not guarantee the investor the
opportunity of a public sale. Registering securities with the SEC is so
complex that a court will not order specific performance if management
balks. Regardless of management's desires, a company cannot make a
public offering on acceptable terms if the company is unsuccessful or if
market conditions are poor. Thus, even demand rights only pressure
managers to register securities.8 3
The adoption of SEC Rule 144A14 in 1990 may be conducive to resales
of venture capital securities. The SEC had long conceded that securities
can be sold privately without registration; but before 1990, it never speci-
fied the conditions for private sales.8" The SEC believes that the new rule
will create a market where investors can more readily sell restricted se-
curities. Some venture capitalists have responded to Rule 144A by ex-
tracting promises from portfolio companies to satisfy the rule's
information requirements.8 6
c. "Unlocking" Clauses
An investor in a close corporation can also cash out in a sale of the
entire firm. However, because managers have pecuniary and psychologi-
cal interests in remaining managers, they may veto a sale that investors
favor. One solution to this problem, an "unlocking" clause, allows the
investor to sell its securities to the company on the same terms that the
81. See 2 HAFT, supra note 65, at 2B-73 to 2B-74.
82. See id. at 2B-69 to 2B-73. If the company is already publicly traded, the investor may
obtain a commitment from the company to maintain disclosure sufficient to satisfy SEC Rule 144 so
that investors can sell their shares pursuant to that rule. See Robert L. Frome, investment Agree-
ment Covenants, 200 N.Y. L.J. 3, 4 (1988).
83. High nondeductible dividends paid on the preferred stock that venture capitalists usually
hold provide an additional incentive. See 2 HAFT, supra note 65, at 1-8.7. Going public encourages
investors to convert their preferred stock to common stock, which usually pays lower dividends. See
Sahlman, supra note 10, at 509.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1992).
85. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 219-24 (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1991).
86. See Bruce A. Mann, Rule 144A and Venture Capital Financing, INSIGHTs, Sept. 1990, at
24, 27.
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managers vetoed.8 7 In effect, this permits the managers not a veto but
only a right of first refusal over offers to acquire the company. This
seems equitable-if the managers deem an offer inadequate, they should
readily acquire the investor's securities at the same inadequate price.
Unlocking clauses appear to pose little threat to managers, since pre-
sumably investors will not sell at an inadequate price. The burden im-
posed by unlocking clauses is mitigated by the difficulty that investors
face obtaining attractive offers subject to a right of first refusal."8 The
new investor should be willing to retain the incumbent managers at their
fair value. Thus, an acquirer should reduce the managers' pay only if the
old investors were overcompensating them. The blocking of acquisitions
by managers anxious to preserve their privileges is a notorious problem
in public companies,8 and one which venture capitalists should address.
Such provisions, however, are unusual for several reasons. First, a
manager's central function is planning. New investors usually oust an
acquired company's managers not because they are incompetent, but be-
cause the acquirer takes over planning.9" Managers' skills are often firm-
specific and are worth less to other firms than to their old employer.
Therefore, a corporate takeover threatens management with diminished
pay and status, or possibly unemployment, regardless of whether they are
currently overpaid. Second, managers cannot easily finance such a
buyout, even at an "inadequate price," or they would have bypassed ven-
ture capital initially. Moreover, an unlocking clause may be triggered
unexpectedly, without the advance notice provided for in mandatory re-
demptions. Since unlocking clauses impose undue burdens upon manag-
ers, they may refuse to accept such clauses."i
87. See DAVID J. GLADSTONE, VENTURE CAPITAL HANDBOOK 129 (1983).
88. This is especially true when an insider holds an unlocking clause right. If the offeror negoti-
ates an advantageous bargain (low offer), the insider will exercise the right. Thus, the insider will
waive the right only if the offeror has offered too much.
89. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 278 (1984) (shareholders generally lose when managers defeat
takeover attempts).
90. See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers,
and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991) (CEOs are replaced more often in acquired com-
panies than in others); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Controk A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1236
(1984).
91. Could companies handle this situation differently, for example, by giving managers gener-
ous severance pay? Perhaps this happens in practice, with managers waiving their veto power in
exchange for some form of compensation. Perhaps companies do not agree to such payments in
advance because of the difficulty of drafting contract provisions to cover all contingencies.
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A venture capitalist can also improve its liquidity by insisting that it be
included in any offer to repurchase the managers' stock.92 This also pro-
tects investors from management self-dealing.
3. Managerial Self-Dealing and Compensation; Freezeouts
An investor who can veto corporate transactions that involve manag-
ers does not need a covenant against self-dealing. Such covenants are
useful, however, when an investor lacks such a veto power.93 Covenants
against self-dealing include limits on the sale of stock, payment of divi-
dends, loans to, and repurchases of stock from, insiders.94 These transac-
tions are often limited rather than forbidden because, in some cases, they
are desirable. For example, stock ownership and stock options motivate
managers to perform well. Venture capitalists, therefore, commonly
agree to give managers stock purchase rights.95 Similarly, a company
should pay dividends if it cannot profitably invest its excess cash. How-
ever, a venture capitalist often owns preferred stock or debt securities
while insiders own the common stock. Accordingly, an investor typi-
cally permits dividends on common stock if equal dividends are paid on
the investor's stock.96
Repurchases of a manager's stock by the corporation may also benefit
an investor. First, if a manager resigns, other stakeholders9 7 may want to
terminate that manager's voting and financial interest in the firm. Also,
by requiring departing managers to sell their stock at a reduced price,
investors deter resignations.98 Second, a manager who retires, dies or
becomes disabled may be "locked-in" with stock that is practically
worthless if the firm pays no dividends and is not publicly traded. Thus,
92. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 31-55 (discussing the shortcomings of control).
94. See generally I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 430-31 (form of limitation on inter-
ested transactions).
95. See id., at 434.15 (form of employee stock purchase agreement). See also id. at 266 (dis-
cussing these agreements).
96. See id. at 336-39 (form of charter provision limiting dividends on common stock).
97. See infra note 127 (defining stakeholder).
98. For example, the repurchase agreement may set the price at book value or at the price that
the manager originally paid for the stock. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 379-80 (form
of repurchase agreement). See also 2A HAFT, supra note 65, at F 10.2-1 to F 10.2-5 (corporation's
option to repurchase at the price the manager originally paid); Jack L. Lewis & Arthur E. Cirulnick,
Stockholders'Agreements - Part 2, 10 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. 81, 96-106 (1985); Jack L.
Lewis & Arthur E. Cirulnick, Stockholders'Agreements - Part 3, 10 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS
J. 107, 107-19 (1985).
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managers may also prefer to be cashed out even at a reduced price. Ac-
cordingly, disabled or retiring managers, or the estate of a deceased man-
ager, may be obliged to sell their stock back to the company. Since this
type of sale functions as a reward to motivate managers while they work,
investors may set the redemption price (often appraised value) higher
than in those cases where the manager departs for another job.99
Managerial compensation is self-dealing that cannot be avoided. If the
investor lacks a general veto over board action, it can negotiate a specific
veto over executive compensation. 100 Investors oppose excessive man-
agement compensation, but they want a compensation package that will
motivate the managers. High salaries may distort managerial incentives
since they encourage executives to be cautious and avoid risks that may
damage the firm's ability to continue paying that salary.101 Although
excessive managerial caution does not breach a fiduciary duty, it can in-
jure the investors as much as managerial self-dealing. This problem is
addressed by designing a compensation package that combines more
modest salaries with significant stock ownership and stock options.
10 2
This helps align the manager's interests to those of investors. It does not,
however, align their interests perfectly, because managers still have an
interest in compensation and perquisites that the investors do not share.
This gap is further bridged by signing the managers to employment con-
tracts when the venture capitalist initially invests, thereby alleviating the
concerns of both sides over compensation and perquisites.
Minority shareholders in close corporations are in danger of majority
attempts to freeze them out-unilaterally seize their equity interest in the
firm. "3 Although most states review the price paid in freezeouts for fair-
99. See Jack L. Lewis & Arthur E. Cirulnick, Stockholders'Agreements-Part 3, 10 ALI-ABA
COURSE MATERIALS J. 107, 107-19 (1985).
100. Investors can accomplish this by requiring a supermajority board vote on executive com-
pensation levels or by requiring a board committee, on which the investor has a veto power, to
decide executive compensation levels.
101. See Dent, supra note 43, at 889-91 (explaining that managers' and investors' interests di-
verge over the appropriate level of risk).
102. See Hoffman & Blakey, supra note 34, at 18. Managers of new firms seeking venture capi-
tal usually accept lower salaries than they had with their previous employers. See Sahlman, supra
note 10, at 508. Giving investors preferred stock rather than common stock helps the managers. It
allows them to take advantage of more favorable tax treatment when they acquire common stock at
low prices. See id. at 510.
103. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 499-504 (1986). Majority shareholders achieve
this by forcing the company to merge into a new firm that is owned entirely by the majority and by
giving the minority shareholders cash or debentures instead of stock in the new firm. The majority
has other ways to freeze out the minority shareholders, such as a reverse stock split. Id.
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ness, the minority shareholders may not like the result. 0 4 Venture capi-
talists who lack a board veto power can avoid freezeouts in two ways.
First, they can purchase securities that explicitly forbid transactions that
materially affect their rights, unless approved by the holders of a major-
ity of that class of security."15 With this option, some minority investors
can still be cashed out against their will if a majority of the security hold-
ers approve. Second, they may obtain a "take-me-along clause" which
forbids managers to exchange their stock unless investors are offered the
same terms.' 0 6 This type of clause is effective since freezeouts are usually
accomplished by merging the firm into a specially created dummy corpo-
ration which issues the managers stock in the new corporation while issu-
ing investors cash or debt securities. A take-me-along clause forces
managers to give investors the same terms that the managers receive.
This prevents transactions in which managers receive stock while the in-
vestors receive cash or debt securities.
4. Abuse of Corporate Opportunities and Information; Competition
with the Firm
Managerial disloyalty may not entail company contracts; therefore, in-
vestors cannot protect themselves completely with a veto power on the
board. Such disloyalty includes use of corporate information for per-
sonal benefit. This encompasses not only trade secrets as ordinarily de-
fined, but also broader information, such as knowledge of and even
personal acquaintances with customers. Investors may address this
problem with non-competition agreements, which forbid employees from
working for competing firms. Such agreements are unreliable, though,
because courts limit their temporal, geographical and industry scope.10 7
Employment agreements are helpful but imperfect.' 08 Therefore, it is
common also to expressly forbid personal use of proprietary informa-
104. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (freezeout subject to strict scrutiny
for fairness); see generally CLARK, supra note 103, at 518-30.
105. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 9.13; Hoffman & Blakey, supra note 34, at 22.
106. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
107. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 630-31.
108. Courts do not specifically enforce employment agreements because forcing an employee to
fulfill his obligation to work would constitute involuntary servitude and because a court could not
supervise the employee's compliance with such an order. To enjoin an employee from working for
another employer, the original employer must demonstrate that the employee's services are "unique
or extraordinary." E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 856 (2d ed. 1990). Employers can re-
cover damages, but the amount of damages is often difficult to prove.
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tion. " By itself this prohibition is also inadequate because it is often
difficult to prove the use of proprietary information. The strengths of
each agreement, however, help to offset the weaknesses of the others.
Employment agreements may also forbid managers from "moonlight-
ing"-working outside the company while still employed by the com-
pany. This type of agreement bars employees from working part-time for
other ventures, whether or not they compete with the company.
These types of covenants also discourage managers from usurping cor-
porate opportunities-opportunities that belong to the firm. Corporate
opportunities that managers of venture-capital financed firms may be
tempted to take normally require the manager to work for another firm,
and thus, are also limited by buy-sell agreements. 1 °0 Both employment
and non-competition agreements would also forbid this. Seizures of cor-
porate opportunities (including those that do not require the manager to
work for another firm) are also curbed by the law of fiduciary duties and
by buy-sell agreements."
5. Dilution and Restrictions on New Issues of Shares
Statutory and contractual preemptive rights can prevent controlling
shareholders from purchasing stock at a low price. Preemptive rights
entitle shareholders to subscribe to new issues of stock in the same pro-
portion as they currently own. This right may not go far enough to pro-
tect investors, as when minority shareholders cannot afford the new
stock, even at a bargain price, and the issuance would shift the control of
the firm. Accordingly, a venture capitalist may forbid all new issues of
stock unless the issuance is approved by all or some supermajority of the
shareholders." 2
Even a veto power over new stock issuances may not adequately pro-
tect investors. Although a venture capitalist may object to losing control
through the entry of a new investor, it may feel morally and legally
109, See I HALLORAN ET AL, supra note 22, at 434.41 (form of agreement relating to proprie-
tary information and agreements).
110. Opportunities that require a substantial investment of money, such as purchasing another
company, will generally exceed the means of managers who had to seek venture capital financing.
Buy-sell agreements often require officers to sell their stock back to the firm at a low price if they
resign. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. This both discourages officers from resigning
in order to exploit corporate opportunities and information and affords the firm relief when an officer
does resign.
11. See CLARK, supra note 103, at 223-62.
112. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 3.20, at 201.
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obliged not to veto a stock sale that is needed to raise money. Therefore,
investors often obtain a first option or right of first refusal over new is-
sues of stock."1 ' These rights go beyond preemptive rights by allowing
an investor to purchase more than its pro rata share-and occasionally
100%-of a new issue. Giving these rights to investors is often costly for
the company because investors exercise first options only if the firm's
stock value exceeds the option price, and because obtaining third party
offers to buy stock is difficult when the sale is subject to a right of first
refusal." 4 These rights may also dilute managers' equity interest, and
thus motivate them to avoid private stock sales, conserve cash and make
a public offering instead. The effect of the investor's rights over new
stock issues is magnified by the use of staged financing, which assures
that the investor's rights come into play quickly and frequently." 5
Venture capitalists usually acquire preferred stock or debt securities
that are convertible into common stock. Conversion rights are both a
sword to promote the venturer's interests and a shield from exploitation
by the managers. First, conversion ratios are often tied to the firm's suc-
cess; the better the firm's performance, the higher the conversion price.
This protects investors against depreciation of their conversion rights
when the company falters. It also spurs managers to succeed; the better
the firm performs, the fewer shares the investors receive on conversion,
and the larger the share of equity that the managers will retain." 6
Investors also fear equity dilution, which is depreciation of the com-
mon stock (and thus of conversion rights) by the issue of cheap stock or
by payouts on already outstanding common stock. Stock dividends,
stock splits, and cash dividends, inter alia, cause equity dilution. Even
an investor who has the power to veto these actions may feel constrained
by fiduciary duties not to do so because they may benefit the company. 17
Covenants that require the company to adjust the conversion ratios in
113. A right of first refusal permits its holder to intervene and purchase by matching the highest
bid by a third party. A first option permits its holder to purchase on specified terms before the seller
offers the opportunity to third parties. See CLARK, supra note 103, at 765. These restrictions may
apply to new stock issues or to sales by shareholders. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 422
(form of right of first refusal applicable to new issues).
114. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying note 52.
116. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 510. Adjustable conversion rates also encourage managers
to formulate realistic earnings projections at the outset because failure to meet these projections will
entitle the investor to a larger portion of the equity on conversion. See id.
117. Some courts hold that shareholders have a fiduciary duty not to use a veto power unreason-
ably to the company's detriment. See Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981)
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such cases will protect the interests of both the investor and the company
itself.
New issues of stock are more problematic. If the sale price is high, the
investor will be satisfied with preemptive rights in the new issue. But
what if the offering price is at market, but lower than the investor's con-
version price? A new sale of stock at a fair price does not cheapen ex-
isting common or conversion rights. Adjusting the conversion price in
this situation cannot be warranted as a defense against management op-
portunism. However, it would be justified by a "most favored investor"
theory that the original investors should be able to convert at the same
price offered to new investors.
Is this adjustment provision wealth-increasing? The loss to the manag-
ers from a lower sale price for the new issue appears to offset any benefit
to the initial investor."" Perhaps antidilution clauses increase firm
wealth by adjusting risk. Selling new stock at a price below the old inves-
tor's conversion price demonstrates that the company's fortunes have de-
clined. Although the value of the managers' stock will have also
declined, their compensation usually does not. Lowering the conversion
price partially reallocates the firm's falling fortunes from investors to
managers. Thus, antidilution clauses further motivate managers to sus-
tain the firm's fortunes and further align the managers' interests to the
investors'.
6. Restrictions on Transfers of Shares
A shareholder may receive an offer to sell his stock without other
shareholders receiving the same offer. Control blocks of stock usually
fetch a premium price. Even a block of stock that does not command
control, but that does carry a board veto power, may merit a premium.
This is especially true if a purchaser wants to deal with the firm and
could profit by blocking alternative deals. A board veto may also give a
purchaser day-to-day control of the business if the other shareholders,
like venture capitalists, lack the skill to manage the firm, or the pur-
(holding that minority shareholder breached fiduciary duty by vetoing payment of dividends, which
caused the corporation to incur tax penalties).
118. Conversion rights dilute the value of outstanding common shares; the lower the conversion
price, the greater the dilution. Accordingly, reducing a conversion ratio in turn lowers the price a
subsequent investor will pay for common stock. The diminution would affect all existing sharehold-
ers except that an antidilution provision protects the venture capitalist. Each reduction in the price
of common stock to outside investors also reduces the venture capitalist's conversion price. Thus,
only the managers suffer from the antidilution clause.
1992] 1057
Washington University Open Scholarship
1058 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
chaser can veto any other candidate to manage. A sale of stock by a
venture capitalist poses lesser, but still substantial, dangers to the manag-
ers. Corporate law, however, generally permits a shareholder (including
one in control of the firm) to sell his shares for a premium without ex-
tending the same offer to the minority shareholders. 1'9 To avoid such
sales, parties often agree on a co-sale clause (also called a tag-along, take-
me-along or include-me-in covenant) which prohibits a sale of stock un-
less the purchaser makes the same offer for all shares.120 Even if the
purchase price does not include a premium, the opportunity to liquidate
an otherwise illiquid investment may be desirable. The co-sale clause
prevents a manager or investor from exploiting such an opportunity
while excluding the other shareholder.
In addition, shareholders in venture capital-financed firms and other
close corporations often agree not to sell their shares without first offer-
ing them to the other shareholders or to the corporation. 121 The ability
to exclude unwanted investors is important, even when the shares for sale
do not carry control, because share ownership confers a right to inspect
the company books and records.122 This right is especially significant in
a company with valuable proprietary information. Agreements to first
offer stock to other shareholders or the corporation do not obviate the
co-sale covenant, however, because exercise of the former requires the
other shareholders to increase their investment in the firm, rather than
cashing it in. Such agreements may further require the other sharehold-
ers to pay a higher price than they can or want to pay.
7 Disclosure
The shareholder's statutory right to inspect firm books and records
119. See CLARK, supra note 103, at 478.
120. See 2A HAFT, supra note 65, at F 11.1 to F 11.3 (form of co-sale agreement); I HALLORAN
ET AL., supra note 22, at 434.3 to 434.14 (semble); Jack L. Lewis & Arthur E. Cirulnick, A Stock-
holders'Agreement, REPRESENTING THE GROWING TECHNOLOGY COMPANY (I ALI-ABA Course
of Study Materials), 1987, at 235-37 (semble).
121. For a general discussion of stock transfer restrictions, see I WILLIAM H. PAINTER, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 3.1 (3d ed. 1991). The covenant may permit the other shareholders to purchase at
the same price offered by the outsider ("right of first refusal") or at a stipulated price ("first option").
See id. § 3.1.2; I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 434.4 (form of right of first refusal); Lewis &
Cirulnick, supra note 120, at 235-37 (combined right of first refusal and take-me-along clauses).
122. State corporation laws typically provide every shareholder "the right ... to inspect for any
proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and
records." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1991). See CLARK, supra note 103, at 96-105.
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may not satisfy a venture capitalist,1 23 who may hold his investment in
the form of debt securities and thus would not be a stockholder entitled
to inspect. Furthermore, the proper purpose condition to inspection
rights may demand more than a general desire to keep informed. In ad-
dition, the inspection right encompasses only papers such as general ac-
counts, and not more specific papers, such as corporate contracts, even
when they are important. Finally, the statutory right only permits a
stockholder to inspect the records that the company maintains; it does
not require the company to keep particular records.
To obtain better disclosure, venture capitalists contract for the com-
pany to maintain and provide specific records. 124 Although disclosure
does not by itself benefit investors, it does help them to ascertain whether
the managers are complying with the law and restrictive covenants and
to sue when they do not. Disclosure is also prophylactic since it helps
deter illegal conduct by managers. 125 Additionally, disclosure helps in-
vestors participate in corporate control and intelligently exercise rights,
such as the right to purchase new shares and the right to have their
shares redeemed by the firm.
Venture capitalists who do not hold directorships often secure "ob-
server rights" to attend board meetings. 126 An observer has no right to
vote or even, in theory, to speak, at board meetings. However, observer
rights do provide valuable information and, in practice, enable investors
to have their views heard and weighed.
8. Risk of Loss and Liquidation Preferences
All corporate stakeholders share in the risk of loss from the firm's fail-
ure.'27 Venture capitalists typically contract for a status superior to the
managers' but inferior to the creditors' in case the firm becomes insol-
123. Federal securities laws exempt most firms financed with venture capital from the broader
disclosure obligations since they only apply to firms with over 500 shareholders and $5,000,000 in
assets. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988); SEC Rule 12g-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I (1992).
124. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 418-22.
125. In the famous words of Justice Brandeis, "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92
(1932).
126. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 343.
127. "Stakeholder" includes not only holders of debt and equity securities, but also trade credi-
tors and employees because they also suffer if the firm folds.
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vent. Why do they bargain for this degree of preference, but no more,
and how do they accomplish their objective?
In bankruptcy, creditors are favored and secured creditors are pre-
ferred over unsecured creditors. Both business and legal motivations en-
courage venture capitalists to partly or completely avoid creditor status.
The principal legal reason is that bankruptcy courts would probably
deny venture capitalists creditor status, even if they hold instruments la-
beled as debt. The doctrine of equitable subordination permits bank-
ruptcy courts to defer a creditor's claim when fairness requires, as, for
example, when a claim labeled as debt is in substance equity.1 2  Because
a venture capitalist holds a substantial equity interest, 2 9 the bankruptcy
court would subordinate any claims that it makes as a creditor to the
other creditors' claims.
Yet, the threat of subordination alone would not deter venture capital-
ists from taking debt securities because subordination only reduces the
claimant to the status of a common stockholder; it leaves the claimant no
worse off than it would have been if it had bought common stock in the
first place. However, using debt can also create business problems. First,
it can hamper the company in obtaining additional credit elsewhere;
lenders and suppliers may deny credit when a company is already heavily
in debt. By contrast, equity investments facilitate borrowing because the
equity provides the creditors with a cushion. Second, interest payments
on debt drain badly needed cash from the company. 30 Third, debt se-
curities usually do not carry voting rights, which the investor wants for
control.
Common stock is not, however, the only alternative to debt securities.
Venture capitalists usually purchase preferred stock with cumulative div-
idends and a liquidation preference over common stock.131 A separate
class of common stock could include these features. Yet, because they
are not typical features of common stock, drafting would be somewhat
128. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988). See generally CLARK, supra note 103, at 52-71.
129. By definition, a venture capitalist holds equity investments. See supra text accompanying
note 9.
130. See supra note 11. A venture capitalist could bargain for debt securities that defer interest
payments. Yet, this would make it clearer that in substance the capitalist holds an equity
investment.
131. See supra note 65 (discussing cumulative dividends); 2 HAFr, supra note 65, at 1-16.3 (dis-
cussing liquidation preferences). Preferred stock's liquidation preference over common stock usually
equals the preferred stock's purchase price plus all accrued dividends.
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difficult.1 1 2 A preferred shareholder's claim is subordinate to creditors'
claims but senior to managers (who own common stock) if the firm dis-
solves. Thus a venture capitalist is better situated holding preferred
stock than it would be with debt securities that a bankruptcy court would
reduce to the priority level of common stock.
Why do managers concede this preference? While managers enjoy
compensation and perquisites from the firm, venture capitalists do not.
Managers may attempt to delay liquidation in order to retain these bene-
fits at the expense of other common stockholders. In effect, the managers
are inclined to spend other people's money to fund their paychecks. The
liquidation preference that favors outsiders forces managers to bear more
of these costs and thus helps deter such opportunism. 133 However, this
solution is imperfect. If a company's losses destroy all of the firm's eq-
uity, the managers will still have an incentive to delay liquidation; they
have nothing to lose. But a liquidation preference does reduce the ven-
ture capitalist's risk of loss.
Some of the covenants discussed earlier also reduce the venture capi-
talist's risk of loss. For example, mandatory redemption provisions not
only allow investors to cash out an otherwise illiquid investment, but also
discourage the same managerial opportunism. In addition, if a right of
redemption becomes exercisable when a firm is in trouble, investors can
use it to compel corporate liquidation, rather than watching helplessly as
executive compensation erodes the firm's assets. Similarly, business
problems may trigger an event-of-election clause that will stop managers'
opportunism by allowing the investor to take control of the firm away
from the managers.
D. Protecting the Company from Restrictive Covenants
The costs of restrictive covenants to a company may exceed their bene-
fits to investors. To avoid this, contracts often provide the company an
egress. First, venture capitalists' restrictive covenants usually end by
their own terms after several years or when the firm goes public."3 4 Ter-
mination, viewed in light of the investor's exit clauses, such as conversion
and mandatory redemption clauses, permits an investor either to cash
132. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 253-54.
133. See id., at 259, 339-44 (discussing the purposes of liquidation preferences). Another com-
mon feature of preferred stock is that it is "participating," which allows its holders to share any gain
on the sale of the corporation with the common stock shareholders. See id. at 340.
134. See id. at 482.
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out or continue its investment in the firm. Yet, in the case of conversion,
the investor must surrender its special securities for common stock. If a
company is so successful that the venture capitalist wants to retain its
investment, then it should willingly surrender these protections.
Automatic termination of restrictive covenants when a company goes
public is interesting in light of criticisms that managers of public compa-
nies can and often do exploit their shareholders.1 35 Perhaps venture cap-
italists discredit these complaints. More likely, going public brings the
investor such great returns that it does not dwell upon future exploita-
tion. Moreover, contracts are ineffective to curb exploitation in public
companies, especially since companies usually go public, if at all, only
several years after initial financing. Because such problems are almost
never handled by contract, there are few models to follow. In addition,
some restrictive covenants, if kept in effect, would hamper a public offer-
ing.1 36 In short, even if venture capitalists are concerned about exploita-
tion after going public, the costs of contracting around the problem at
the time of the initial investment would exceed the benefits. 137
Some companies negotiate an option to redeem (or "call") the inves-
tors' securities in order to eliminate the restrictive covenants.' 3 s A pend-
ing call forces the investors to choose between conversion and liquidation
of their investment. The investors' reasons for accepting this option de-
pend on the circumstances. Securities subject to call 139 are, like most
venture capital securities, hybrids-preferred stock or convertible debt
with some of the features of common stock. Managers generally prefer
to finance with debt; they sell equity only if a company is too risky to
borrow.' 4° Thus, more stable companies issue securities that more re-
semble debt while less secure companies issue securities that are more
akin to common stock.
135. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 43, at 884-92.
136. For example, venture capital covenants often stipulate the composition of the company's
board of directors. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 429. When a company goes public,
these covenants could give the venture capitalist a disproportionate power over the board and de-
prive the other shareholders of fair representation.
137. Furthermore, when a company goes public the venture capitalist typically retains sufficient
common stock to effectively resist managerial exploitation.
138. See 2 HAFr, supra note 65, at Fl.I-3 to Fl.1-4 (form of optional redemption).
139. This Article takes the company's perspective: labeling redemption at the company's option
as "optional" redemption clauses, while labeling redemption at the investor's option as "mandatory"
redemption clauses. From the investor's perspective, these labels would be reversed.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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Debt securities are usually redeemable14 1 by the corporation because
of its fear that interest rates will fall after a loan is made, thus forcing the
company to pay higher interest rates than its competitors. A call option
permits a company to refinance its debt at a lower interest rate. Without
this option, a lender could profit from a decline in interest rates, but in
return for this opportunity it would have to accept a lower rate of return
on the debt securities. In effect, the lender would then be betting that
interest rates will decline. Since both lenders and borrowers tend to be
risk averse, however, they avoid this gamble by agreeing to a corporate
redemption provision. 142
Venture capital securities are often redeemable when they resemble
debt more than equity-that is, when the company is fairly stable,
though not solid enough to obtain a straight loan. Call provisions in
venture capital arrangements differ from other redemption clauses. In
venture capital, call provisions reflect concern more about the company's
solvency than about interest rates. Management, in effect, gambles that
the company's fortunes will improve so that it can redeem, refinance at a
lower cost, and escape the restrictive covenants. 143 It is misleading, how-
ever, to assume that the investor gambles that the company's fortune will
not improve, because if the company's fortune does improve, the inves-
tor's conversion right appreciates. Consequently, in venture capital
deals, the corporation's option to redeem works primarily to force an
investor conversion that will relieve the company of the burdens of inter-
est (or dividend) payments and restrictive covenants.
Two common venture capital provisions particularly trouble manag-
ers: (1) mandatory redemptions, because they often impose an impossible
financial burden on the company; and (2) event-of-election clauses, be-
cause they often result in the ouster of the managers who founded and
nurtured the company. This Article has noted various justifications for
these clauses. Because of the dynamics of the negotiation process, it is
difficult for managers to resist these terms. Managers who seek venture
capital offer projections of sales and earnings. Interested investors then
demand that the managers demonstrate faith in their own projections by
141. See Smith & Warner, supra note 13, at 142-43 (describing bond redemption provisions and
the rationale underlying them).
142. Curiously, traditional lenders rarely insist on protection against a sharp rise in interest
rates.
143 If an investor converts its investment to common stock, the company will escape its obliga-
tion to pay interest or preferred stock dividends. The investor surrenders the restrictive covenants
because the company has reached the stage where the investor no longer needs such protection.
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agreeing to redeem the investor's securities or to allow the investors to
seize control if management fails to meet those projections. Managers
cannot reject these demands without appearing to repudiate their projec-
tions. Nonetheless, managers are likely to feel exploited by the investors
if the projections are not met because of circumstances beyond the man-
agers' control.
III. VENTURE CAPITAL LESSONS FOR CORPORATE LAW
Much literature on the law of economic transactions, including corpo-
rate finance, now focuses on the hypothetical bargaining model. This
literature analyzes default rules (also called residual, gap-filler, or back-
ground rules), which are the rules that will govern the parties unless they
agree otherwise. The model argues that default rules should be the rules
that most people would agree to if they were able to negotiate without
transaction costs.'" This presumes that people are economically rational
and that they would draft contract terms which are efficient in maximiz-
ing the parties' total wealth.145
The problem with using the model is determining which rules maxi-
mize the parties' total wealth. In corporate transactions, maximizing
wealth consists primarily in minimizing agency costs. These costs in-
clude an agent's opportunism, shirking and incompetence, and the prin-
cipal's costs in attempting to reduce these problems. These agency costs
cannot be measured precisely by induction. 46 Empirical evidence may
help in calculating the costs; however, it frequently does not exist be-
cause in neither public nor close corporations do passive (or outside) in-
vestors generally negotiate for protections against managerial
opportunism.
Venture capital offers a rare paradigm because the outside investors do
144. See, eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369-72 (3d ed. 1986); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Jr. & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-03
(1982).
145. This may, however, create wealth distribution problems. For example, the wealth maximiz-
ing solution may make Investor X $20 better off, but leave Investor Y $10 worse off. The Coase
theorem solves this problem (transactions costs aside) by positing that the parties can negotiate a
transfer payment that results in a sharing of the benefit of the chosen alternative. See Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also infra note 185. Both investors
in the hypothetical benefit if they choose the wealth maximizing solution and have Investor X trans-
fer to Investor Y any amount from $10 to $20.
146. For example, commentators disagree about the efficiency of antitakeover statutes and char-
ter amendments. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: Tile Empiri-
cal Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 896, 910-13 (1992).
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negotiate with management, but this paradigm must be analyzed with
care. Some scholars believe that "[s]hareholder expectations [in close
corporations] are remarkably uniform, and the situations in which they
vary are quite well defined."' 4 7 Venture capital belies this view since
deals vary so widely that typical terms do not exist.14 This diversity of
terms may even argue against a search for a hypothetical optimal bar-
gain. Analogies to firms financed with venture capital are also problem-
atic because these firms are growing and not fully developed, unlike most
other close corporations. A company that has achieved its desired size
and a stable stream of profits can reject contract terms that venture capi-
talists often demand, because it can instead borrow from banks or simply
forego additional financing. Further, unlike many minority shareholders
in close corporations, venture capitalists do not expect or desire to be
officers of the firm or to participate in its day-to-day control. 149 The in-
terests of active corporate participants differ significantly from those of
passive investors such as venture capitalists.
Perhaps venture capitalists are too sophisticated and potent bargainers
to serve as a model for other minority investors. As repeat players with
experienced counsel, venture capitalists can often outmaneuver manag-
ers, who are generally unschooled in corporate finance and who often
retain inexperienced lawyers or, in crucial early negotiations, no attorney
at all. The managers' desperation often aggravates their plight; venture
capital is usually their only source of capital. 5 ' On the other hand, ven-
ture capitalists can afford to accept less protection than investors in other
close corporations because venturers recognize that the company will
need additional rounds of financing and that the company will need their
cooperation for these financings. Thus, although venture capital cove-
nants are sometimes more favorable than those that investors could ex-
pect to procure in other types of minority investments, they are not so
one-sided as to make venture capital useless as a model.
Defining the hypothetical optimal bargain in order to establish default
rules is difficult. Yet, when contracting parties overlook a contingency,
the law must supply a term. Ideally, courts treat each case individually
147 John A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Respon-
sibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 21 (1987).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
149. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALY-
sis 12-17 (1976) (discussing distinction between active participants and passive investors).
150. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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and shape the remedy on the expectations and needs of the particular
parties. Personalized justice is far too expensive for both the parties in-
volved and the justice system, however; thus, courts must fashion general
rules. The question, then, is not whether venture capital arrangements
form a perfect model for close corporations; clearly they do not. Rather
the question is whether venture capital arrangements better replicate
what most parties in close corporations would agree to than do the de-
fault rules now fixed by corporate law. In many respects, the answer to
this question is yes.
A. Sales of Control for a Premium
A perennial issue in corporate law is whether to allow controlling
shareholders to sell their stock at a premium from which other share-
holders are excluded. With some ill-defined exceptions, courts now per-
mit these sales. 151 Venture capitalists, though, usually obtain take-me-
along (or tag along) clauses that forbid such sales. Thus, the venturers
enable themselves to participate in the unusual opportunity to cash out
an illiquid investment and protect themselves from a potential purchaser
of control who could exploit them.152 However, giving minority inves-
tors an equal right to sell can create problems. First, tag-along rights
inhibit transfers of control that would benefit all parties. For example, a
controlling shareholder/manager who has passed his prime may refuse to
sell his stock except at a premium price that no purchaser would agree to
pay for all of the firm's shares.15 3 Second, a controlling shareholder
either creates or pays for control; minority shareholders do not. There-
fore, fairness would dictate letting a controlling shareholder sell his con-
trol-block of stock for a premium price.
The argument for including minority shareholders in control sales is at
its weakest when applied to public corporations. Since a public firm's
stock is openly traded on the market, the control sale does not represent
a unique opportunity to sell an illiquid investment. Further, in a close
corporation, it is quite feasible to obtain waivers from a minority share-
holder of a tag-along right if the purchaser is not objectionable and if the
sale will benefit all parties. In a public company, though, obtaining waiv-
151. See CLARK, supra note 103, at 478-98.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
153. Since control carries a distinct value, and since purchasing minority shares does not en-
hance that value, purchasers will generally pay less per share if they must purchase more shares than
the minimum necessary to obtain control.
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ers is impossible. Thus, a rule that bars the sale of control for a premium
should not apply to public corporations.
The argument that controlling shareholders create or pay for control
(while the minority do not) is somewhat circular. Minority investors pay
a control premium if they expect to obtain a share in corporate control.
Take-me-along covenants are fair because investors pay for them. This
suggests that any changes in the default rule should only operate pro-
spectively, and therefore, a court should find a take-me-along right only
if the seller knew that he was selling such a right. If courts bar premiums
for the sale of control, then when investors purchase control they will not
have to pay a premium and therefore should not complain when they too
are barred from later selling for a premium. A firm's founders will also
be prohibited from selling their control for a premium, but this fact is
unlikely to deter entrepreneurs from starting new enterprises.
In summary, the use of take-me-along rights in venture capital ar-
rangements strongly suggests that the law should extend such a right.
However, this right should apply only prospectively and only to share-
holders of close corporations. Furthermore, since the right should oper-
ate only prospectively, it should be instituted by statute, not by case law.
B. Unequal Repurchases
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, Inc. , the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts prohibited a company from purchasing stock from a
controlling shareholder without offering the same opportunity to the mi-
nority shareholders. Although several courts have followed Donahue, a
few courts have rejected it.' 55
Many venture capital contracts forbid unequal stock repurchases, con-
firming the general wisdom of Donahue. However, these contracts in-
clude important exceptions. An agreement may permit or even require a
company to repurchase stock owned by an officer who resigns. 56 These
terms are intended to benefit the company, not the officer; the agreement
sets the purchase price so low that other shareholders would not sell at
154. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
155. See Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978) (following Donahue); Toner v. Balti-
more Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657 (Mass. 1976) (extending Donahue to discharge of employee-shareholder); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977) (rejecting Donahue; to prevail, minority shareholders must show majority
shareholder acted in bad faith); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Jr. & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corpo-
rations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 293-96 (1986) (criticizing Donahue).
156. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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the same price. In cases of death, disability, or retirement, however, the
price is usually higher, so that other shareholders might want to have
their shares repurchased at the same price, especially when the stock is
illiquid. This shows that unequal repurchases are not always unfair.'
In addition, venture capitalists often have the right to have their stock
redeemed under certain conditions.'" 8 The inequality of shareholder
treatment is even sharper with these redemption clauses than it is for
repurchases on death, disability or retirement. Anyone may become dis-
abled, and everyone will retire and die, albeit at different times. Redemp-
tion clauses, however, benefit only the venture capitalist. This also
demonstrates that parties often do agree to unequal repurchases; conse-
quently, the rule of Donahue is too broad. At a minimum, courts should
uphold agreements for unequal repurchases unless they are manifestly
unreasonable.
C. Dissolution and Mandatory Buyouts
Minority shares in close corporations are illiquid and rarely pay divi-
dends, so the stock is often worthless unless the shareholder is an em-
ployee who is receiving a salary. 59 To address this problem Professors
Hetherington and Dooley ("H & D") propose that shareholders of close
corporations should be allowed to liquidate their shares at any time
through either a forced buyout by the other shareholders or a dissolution
of the company.1 60 They would permit any shareholder who owns fifty
percent or less of a close corporation's stock to demand that the other
shareholders buy his stock at an agreed upon price, or at a price fixed by
a court if the parties cannot agree on price. If the other shareholders
cannot or will not make the purchase, the shareholder may force the
corporation to dissolve. This proposal would radically change the law of
close corporations. Their approach resembles partnership law, under
which any partner can liquidate his interest at any time, by demanding
dissolution of the partnership.1 6'
That venture capitalists often obtain mandatory redemption agree-
157. Donahue itself concerned a repurchase from a disabled controlling shareholder. 328
N.E.2d at 510. Thus, while the general rule of the case is wise, its application in that case is
questionable.
158. These provisions are discussed more fully in part II, supra.
159. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 1.03, at 1-5 to 1-6 (citing examples).
160. John A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
161. See infra note 180.
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ments 162 demonstrates that sophisticated investors fear illiquidity and
will contract to avoid it. However, mandatory redemption agreements
are narrower than the right which H & D propose. First, the redemption
right usually ripens only after a few years have passed. Second, the
agreed price for a redemption right is typically the original purchase
price plus interest, rather than the appraised value at the time of the
buyout.163 Third, rights of redemption generally extend only to the ven-
ture capitalist-an outsider-and not to the managers. While agree-
ments that mirror the H & D proposal by extending the right to force a
buyout to all shareholders-dubbed "Russian roulette" provisions-do
exist, they are rare."
The restrictions on venture capital redemption rights suggest that H &
D's proposal is too broad. Permitting redemption only after several
years have passed enables the managers to get the firm started and, if
necessary, to seek substitute capital. Without this delay, managers could
face a quick and unexpected need to refinance. Refinancing may be diffi-
cult because managers do not seek venture capital at the outset when
financing is easy. Moreover, without a time delay, a venture capitalist
could trigger dissolution in order to seize the company on liquidation at a
bargain price.165 This threat could hobble a company seeking long-term
purchase or sale contracts or other long-term commitments. 166 At a
minimum, courts should distinguish growth companies from stable, de-
veloped companies. The latter generally have a positive cash flow and
can refinance more easily than growth companies. 167 Problems of refi-
nancing should caution courts against dissolving growth companies.
162. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
164, See Lewis & Cirulnick, supra note 98, at 49, 117-18.
165. See id. at 118 ("Russian roulette" provisions that are similar to the H & D proposal may
favor the deep pocket or be "abused by trigger-happy or hot-tempered principals in a corporation").
The H & D proposal may also provide the party receiving a buyout demand time because it can
litigate over issues such as price. Such delay creates uncertainty in the firm, however, because cus-
tomers, employees, and suppliers can only speculate about the firm's future. This confusion com-
pounds the already difficult task of raising new capital to finance the buyout. See supra text
accompanying notes 77-78. Outside investors may refrain from such opportunism because they are
unable to run the company. In some cases, however, other managers (perhaps incumbent lower level
officers) may be available to operate the firm. Moreover, investors could use a threat of corporate
dissolution as leverage to gain more favorable terms from the managers.
166. See Klein, supra note 58, at 1547 n.87.
167. The H & D proposal would avoid a "sudden cash drain" by "authorizing the court, upon a
showing of good cause, to provide for installment payments of the purchase price for a period of time
not exceeding five years." Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 160, at 51. This provision assists
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The H & D proposal requires a court to determine a fair buyout
price.168 A contractually stipulated redemption price, however, reduces
investors' uncertainty about whether to demand redemption and elimi-
nates the high costs of an appraisal proceeding. A stipulated price also
removes the advantage that managers enjoy in appraisal proceedings due
to their control over the company and its books. Without a contractually
fixed redemption price, investors must investigate and challenge per-
ceived distortions of the company's value.
The pricing of venture capital redemption rights at their original
purchase price plus interest reveals their limited purpose. If a company
falters, corporate law will bar redemptions.' 69 This would also be true
under the H & D proposal. If the company prospers, the stock's value
will exceed the redemption price and the shareholder will probably waive
the redemption right.1 70 Thus, mandatory redemption only allows inves-
tors to get their money back with a modest return when the company has
stalled. Unlike the H & D proposal, mandatory redemption is not in-
tended to resolve disputes in successful companies. 171
Managers are generally excluded from mandatory redemptions for sev-
eral reasons. First, the exclusion motivates them to succeed. If the com-
pany stumbles, outsiders can bail out, but the managers cannot. Like
passengers on a sinking ship, investors can head for the lifeboats; like the
captain, the managers must stay with the ship and therefore have a
strong motive to keep it afloat. Second, the exclusion of managers
reduces the problem of information asymmetry. Enjoying superior com-
pany information, managers could opportunistically insist "buy me out
firms with sufficient cash flow to make the installment payments, but is useless to growth companies
that constantly need more capital.
168. The H & D theory would require judicial appraisal only if the parties failed to agree oil a
buyout price. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 160, at 51. The ability of either party to demand
ajudicial determination of the buyout price, however, means that the parties' estimate of thejudicial
appraisal will guide their bargaining.
169. See supra note 75.
170. For a discussion of this point and an important qualification, see supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
171. Mandatory redemption typically attaches only to preferred stock or debentures. Venture
capitalists lose their mandatory redemption right when they convert such investments to common
stock. This further demonstrates that mandatory redemption rights are not intended for succcssful
companies since investors typically convert to common stock when a company succeeds. However,
conversion to common stock often occurs when a company goes public since investors no longer
need the mandatory right of redemption to avoid illiquidity.
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or I'll buy you out," and the non-manager investors would lack the infor-
mation necessary to respond intelligently.
Third, and most importantly, the managers' control of the business
would allow them to demand unfair buyouts. Suppose that managers
could demand a buyout whenever they could obtain new financing with
better terms. In theory, the investors could respond to the buyout de-
mand by purchasing the managers' shares, but in practice, this response
is unlikely because the investors generally cannot run the company or
find substitute managers. 72 Therefore, if managers held a right of re-
demption they could demand a buyout, confident that the investors could
not operate the firm themselves or hire new managers. Thus, the inves-
tors would have no choice but to allow the managers to buy them out,
perhaps at an inadequate price.
By contrast, the problems that investors would face in operating the
company themselves and in settling the managers' employment contracts
deter them from wielding a buyout right opportunistically. A venture
capitalist worries about its reputation; if it squeezes out managers at a
low price, other managers will not bring it attractive deals. Also, as pre-
viously noted, venture capital buyouts require advance notice and pay
only a limited price. Therefore, a venture capitalist will ordinarily exer-
cise a buyout only when the company is in financial trouble.
Managers are not only excluded from mandatory redemptions, but are
also locked into the company more tightly by various covenants. Sales of
their shares to outsiders can be restricted. They also can be forbidden
from selling their shares at a premium without including the investors in
the sale.'73 In addition, employment contracts can prohibit managers
from competing with the company if they resign. 174 Buyout agreements
can force them to sell their shares back to the company at a low price if
they voluntarily leave the firm.' 75 Further, venture capitalists typically
have a liquidation preference 76 in bankruptcy that may entitle them to
most of the company's assets if the firm liquidates. These factors deter
managers from, for example, seeking dissolution when they disagree with
the venture capitalist.
172. Moreover, the H & D proposal does not allow investors who demand a buyout to abandon
the managers' employment contracts. Thus, the investors may have to pay the old managers' sala-
ries even if they hire new managers.
173. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 98.
176. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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Managers are excluded from redemption clauses and locked in by re-
strictions on their employment and sales of shares because of their more
active and central role in the company. While managers receive corpo-
rate payouts through salaries, investors do not. Investors in close corpo-
rations can hold their shares indefinitely without receiving any payouts.
Managers initiate the business, run the day-to-day operations, and obtain
capital from investors by projecting certain results. Investors should be
able to exit more easily than the managers if the investors are not receiv-
ing corporate payouts and the managers fail to produce the results that
they predicted.
An investor who has a board veto could unreasonably create deadlocks
on board decisions from which the managers might seek escape. For
reasons previously discussed, however, a venture capitalist is unlikely to
act so inappropriately. Moreover, if a venture capitalist does behave un-
fairly or if a board deadlock does occur, managers have remedies. They
can demand arbitration if the parties' arrangement so provides, or they
can petition a court for dissolution or other relief.'7 7 Although the inves-
tors' liquidation preference in bankruptcy, the problems of refinancing,
and the costs of litigation all discourage dissolution, it is available in ex-
treme circumstances. 7 ' Finally, disgruntled managers have the option
of simply quitting. Courts will not order specific performance of their
employment contracts. Investors can sue for damages and for enforce-
ment of a noncompetition agreement, but a court is unlikely to grant
significant relief to an investor who has acted inequitably. Thus, manag-
ers generally do not need a right to dissolve or redeem in order to protect
themselves.
Nonetheless, the disparate treatment of venture capitalists and manag-
ers may not always be fair. Managers often resist inclusion of mandatory
buyout clauses, sometimes with success. 179 When the parties agree to
177. See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expecta-
tions, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 228-36 (1988) (discussing alternative remedies to dissolution).
178. The liquidation preference does not necessarily make dissolution unattractive to managers.
The preference generally assures that investors will receive a minimum return on their investment
before the managers receive anything in liquidation. See supra note 131. Thus, the liquidation pref-
erence discourages managers from dissolving the firm and purchasing its assets on liquidation for a
bargain price because the venture capitalist, who is unable to run the company, cannot make a
serious bid. If the company prospers, however, the venture capitalist's liquidation preference will
not exceed the fair value of its securities, and therefore will not deter the managers from seeking
dissolution in case of legitimate dissatisfaction.
179. See I HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 346 ("Mandatory redemptions tend to be the
exception rather than the rule in venture capital financings.").
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such terms, it may reflect the investor's superior bargaining power rather
than efficiency. But the prevalence of these terms, and the absence of
covenants facilitating exit by managers, strongly suggests that the law
need not expand the exit opportunities for managers.
Corporate dissolution can be made too easy, as demonstrated by the
problem of opportunistic dissolutions in partnerships. In general, any
partner may dissolve a partnership at any time.180 Courts have invoked
common law fiduciary duties to curb partners who exploit this right by
dissolving a partnership in order to purchase its assets at a bargain
price. ' H & D's proposal would extend the same right and the same
problem to close corporations.
Although venture capital arrangements suggest that the H & D propo-
sal goes too far, they also suggest that some critics of judicial dissolution
are misguided. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that par-
ties who form close corporations reject broad buyout rights because
buyouts can trigger a liquidity crisis for the other investors. 182 Many
venture capital deals not only confer such a right, but impose the buyout
obligation on the least liquid party, the managers. Although buyouts can
create an illiquidity problem for the managers, avoiding that problem is
not always the highest priority. Indeed, buyouts benefit investors since
they can redress the investors' illiquidity problem and can also protect
them from exploitation. Mandatory redemption clauses show that the
latter concerns often override the firm's illiquidity concerns.
Should courts require a redemption where the parties have not agreed
to it? Arguably not, because even venture capital deals often omit
buyout rights. This does not prove, however, that courts should limit
involuntary buyouts and dissolution, as Easterbrook and Fischel argue,
to cases of oppression and deadlock. 18 3 Venture capitalists have many
protections other than mandatory redemptions, but other investors often
180. Uniform Partnership Act ("U.P.A.") §§ 31(1)(b) and 31(2) provide that "the express will of
any partner" may cause partnership dissolution. U.P.A. §§ 31(1)(b), 31(2) (1914 & Supp. 1992). If
dissolution does not violate the partnership agreement, the U.P.A. imposes no sanctions against the
partner that caused dissolution, even if it is grossly unfair. Cf. U.P.A. §§ 37-38.
181. See Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (holding that dissolution of a partnership for
purpose of seizing its assets at less than fair value violates partner's fiduciary duty); see generally II
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 7.02(c) (1988). Recognizing this
problem, the drafters of the revisions to the Uniform Partnership Act propose to restrict partnership
dissolutions. See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of the Uniform Part-
nership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 435-53 (1991).
182. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 155, at 289.
183 Id. at 286-90.
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fail to obtain these protections. Reasonable investors do not intend to
forego payouts indefinitely while the managers reap handsome compen-
sation. If the parties anticipate such a situation, they will probably agree,
as most venture capitalists do, that the passive investor could then re-
deem his shares.
Easterbrook and Fischel complain that a buyout often necessitates a
corporate liquidation that in turn dissipates much of a firm's value.18 4
That result is possible, but not inevitable. If a firm is successful, its man-
agers may be able to finance a buyout, especially if the agreement permits
installment payments. If managers cannot finance the buyout, they know
their industry and can find a buyer more easily than outside investors
can. If a company has no chance of ever making a profit, there is proba-
bly little going concern value to be lost in a sale. If corporate dissolution
is likely to dissipate going concern value, the investors will probably set-
tle with the managers, especially since the alternative is lengthy, costly
litigation."' 5 If the current managers are important to a firm's success, a
buyer will want to retain them."8 6 This possibility both eases the manag-
ers' employment problem and helps to salvage the company's going con-
cern value. These factors do not eliminate all the problems of mandatory
buyouts, but no option will be ideal for all parties. The alternative to a
buyout is rather a situation in which the managers draw compensation
while the outside investors receive no return on their investment. Be-
tween the two alternatives, a mandatory buyout of the investor, while
imperfect, is preferable.
The example of venture capital suggests that passive investors should
be able to demand a buyout by managers, but that the reverse should not
be allowed absent a destructive deadlock."s7 Courts should allow inves-
tors to demand a buyout only if they give managers a long notice period
184. Id. at 289-90.
185. As Easterbrook & Fischel noted, under the Coase theorem "[olrdinarily, if the number of
contracting parties is small enough and property rights are well specified, the parties will dicker to
the optimal solution no matter what the legal rule may be." Id. at 287 (citing Coase, supra note
145).
186. Managers who are critical to the firm's success may even be able to secure a disproportion-
ate share of the sale's proceeds, in the form of side payments, from the new investors. They can also
threaten to resign if an undesirable bidder succeeds in purchasing the firm. Since they control their
own labor, such threats are entirely fair. They can also play favorites in the bidding process by
leaking inside information to a competing bidder in exchange for promises of favorable employment
arrangements.
187. When all shareholders actively participate in the business, the H & D proposal to permit
holders of 50% or fewer of the shares to demand a buyout seems wise.
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to permit a search for substitute financing. Managers should not be al-
lowed to refuse a buyout and then demand corporate dissolution unless
they are barred from bidding for the firm's assets upon dissolution."'
Because the interests and goals of shareholders vary, courts should up-
hold agreements that modify the default rules if they are not manifestly
unfair.
D. Freezeouts
Venture capitalists usually obtain some protection against freezeouts,
but this protection is often just a right to vote as a class on a freezeout
proposal.1 8 9 The protection is limited because freezeouts can benefit in-
vestors. Managers, alone or with others, may offer to buy the outside
investors' stock at an attractive price, but condition the offer on partici-
pation of all outside investors. I ° By limiting their protection to a major-
ity class vote, venture capitalists make sure that a small minority cannot
veto an attractive conditional purchase offer.
Corporate law is still struggling with the issue of freezeouts. Some
states prohibit them, yet most permit freezeouts and subject them to
strict scrutiny for fairness.' 9 ' In the leading case, Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. ,92 the Delaware Supreme Court held that approval by an informed
majority of the minority shareholders is strong evidence of fairness and
shifts the burden of proof on fairness from the defendant (majority share-
holders) to the plaintiffs (minority shareholders)."' The practice of ven-
ture capitalists suggests that the Weinberger approach is more
appropriate than a fiat prohibition. Sophisticated investors accept the
possibility of freezeouts if they are approved by a majority of the outside
investors. Corporate law default rules should do the same.
188. Frequently the managers are crucial to the continued success of a business. In such cases
they can purchase the firm for far less than its value to them because the firm is worth far less to
other investors who cannot guarantee that these critical managers will stay with the firm. A bargain
purchase by the managers gives outside investors less than their fair share of the going concern
value, See In re Radom & Neidorf, 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1954) (denying dissolution where it
would permit manager to seize the going concern value at an inadequate price). This result can be
avoided by prohibiting managers from bidding or by allowing only fair price bids. In practice, the
latter solution closely resembles a buyout.
189. See supra note 33.
190. Managers may need this condition to eliminate restrictive covenants or to achieve a proper
balance of power with a new investor on the board of directors.
191. See supra notes 103-04.
192. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
193. Id. at 703.
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E. Voting Rights and Control
Statutes that govern voting and control of small businesses impose re-
markably dissimilar rules for legal entities that are functionally similar.
Subject to modification by the parties' agreement, the default rule in part-
nerships is one partner, one vote. Ordinary business is decided by a ma-
jority vote, but extraordinary changes require a unanimous vote.1 94 In
most corporate statutes, however, the general rule is that the board of
directors manages the firm and is elected by a simple majority of share-
holders. Therefore, even a large minority of shareholders voting alone
cannot elect a single director, but a shareholder with fifty-one percent of
the outstanding stock can elect the entire board. ' 95 Cumulative voting is
an intermediate position which is the corporate default rule in some
states and an option by charter provision in other states. Cumulative
voting produces roughly proportional representation on corporate
boards-it generally enables minority shareholders to elect a proportion
of directors roughly equal to the proportion of the stock they own.'
96
Which rule of governance would parties elect in most small businesses?
Venture capital agreements vary too much to offer a simple explanation.
Indeed, they demonstrate that none of the governing forms is appropriate
for all small businesses. However, two generalizations can be asserted.
First, minority shareholders frequently obtain board seats that the usual
majority-take-all rule would deny.1 97 Rarely do venture capitalists re-
ceive less board representation than they would have received under cu-
mulative voting. Second, venture capitalists frequently obtain board
representation even when they invest through preferred stock or debt,
especially when the firm has missed dividends or interest payments. 98
These patterns suggest that cumulative voting should be the default
194. U.P.A. §§ 18(e), 18(h); see II BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 181, § 6.03.
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (1991).
196. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1991) (general rule of cumulative voting). With
straight, or non-cumulative voting, shareholders may cast one vote for each share that they own for
one candidate for each open board seat. Under cumulative voting, a shareholder casts the same
number of votes, but may "accumulate" his votes and cast them for a single candidate. Board
representation under cumulative voting is only roughly proportional, especially when the board is
small. For example, if a board has only three directors, cumulative voting does not assure that a
minority investor can elect a director unless he holds over 25% of the voting shares. See generally
CLARK, supra note 103, at 361-66.
197. See supra notes 33-34.
198. See supra note 39.
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rule (probably the minimum default rule)1 99 for close corporations. The
usual argument against cumulative voting-that it can lead to a divided
and ineffective board-is unconvincing in practice. To ensure that sub-
stantial equity investors are not denied board representation due to a
firm's having a small board, an investor (or several investors voting to-
gether) who holds more than a specified share of the equity-for exam-
ple, fifteen percent-should have a right to a board seat. Although a
single board seat carries no veto over board actions, it provides substan-
tial equity holders a valuable window on firm activities. It may also
make the majority more accountable because the minority can monitor
potential breaches of fiduciary duties 2°° and can argue views that the ma-
jority may not otherwise consider.
Similarly, holders of preferred stock and debt securities should have a
statutory right to elect directors when the company fails to make re-
quired dividends or interest payments. In such cases, either the firm is in
financial trouble or is abusing its non-equity investors. In either case, the
non-equity investors are at risk and need board representation to the
same extent as minority common stockholders. Board representation for
preferred shareholders whose dividends are in arrears is not a novel idea
and will not unduly burden firms. The New York Stock Exchange re-
quires such rights as a condition for listing preferred stock, and the rule
has caused no problems.2 °1
Holders of debt securities are represented in bankruptcy.2" 2 Giving
lenders board seats in cases of serious default may reduce corporate op-
portunism and enable debt holders to postpone forcing firms into bank-
ruptcy; thus, all parties will save money.20 3 A right to elect directors
199. Corporate law should allow minority shareholders to contract for greater board representa-
tion than cumulative voting would provide.
200, See CLARK, supra note 103, at 363.
201. N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual (CCH) 313.00(E) (1989) (explaining that a company
must allow preferred shareholders to elect at least two directors if dividends have gone unpaid for
longer than six quarters). The SEC requires companies subject to § 6 and § 7 of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 to allow preferred shareholders to elect a majority of the board when
dividends have gone unpaid for a full year. Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No.
13,106, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 36,691 (Feb. 16, 1956).
202 See I DANIEL R. COWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.16 (1989) (discussing
creditors' committees).
203. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 203-05, 215-24
(1986). See also VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR-
PORATE FINANCE 241 n.k (2d ed. 1979) ("The creation of voting power for bondholders, with at-
tendant control of the enterprise, may be a more substantial means for enforcing protective
covenants, than the right to seek judicial assistance.").
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upon serious default should extend only to holders of debt securities-
lenders-and not to trade creditors because a lender's interest is usually
financially greater and longer temporally. Reflecting the distinction be-
tween lenders and trade creditors, lenders often bargain for board repre-
sentation while trade creditors rarely bargain for it.2 °
Although a venture capitalist who elects a board minority cannot
block action on most matters, it is common to give such investors a veto
power over major business decisions, such as mergers and sales of sub-
stantially all assets. This veto power is implemented by requiring a
supermajority board vote for such decisions.2 °5 Many state statutes
achieve a similar result by requiring a supermajority shareholder vote in
such cases.206 The practice of venture capitalists confirms the wisdom of
these statutes for close corporations. Apparently the benefit to the mi-
nority of a veto power over major decisions outweighs the costs of that
veto to the majority.
F. Corporate Opportunities
State laws on corporate opportunities vary widely. Some states permit
fiduciaries to seize an opportunity unless the company has an "interest or
expectancy" in it or the opportunity is "essential" to the firm. Other
states apply different tests, such as whether the opportunity is in the
same "line of business."20 7 Venture capital contracts broadly prohibit
managers from taking corporate opportunities. Employment, non-com-
petition and buyout agreements discourage, and largely forbid, managers
to affiliate with another company in the firm's industry.208 Presumably
such agreements are efficient. Courts should lean toward broad rules
that prohibit managers from taking corporate opportunities. However,
courts should also honor reasonable contractual exceptions. Further-
more, courts should create exceptions when a broad prohibition would be
too harsh.
As previously noted, the practice of venture capitalists in this area
204. Trade creditors could, however, still obtain such rights by contract, and lenders could
waive such rights.
205. See supra note 34.
206. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78(F) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1991) (vote of
holders of two-thirds of shares required to approve merger).
207. See generally CLARK, supra note 103, at 223-62; Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities:
Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment, and the Agent's Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 155 (1988).
208. See supra notes 98, 107-10 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/2
VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE FINANCE
demonstrates another problem with H & D's proposal.20 9 Buyouts are
often priced to deter managers from voluntarily leaving a company. A
low buyout price discourages management abuses of corporate opportu-
nities that are otherwise difficult to prohibit. 210 Courts should consider
this when corporate officers seek judicial dissolution.
IV. VENTURE CAPITAL IN THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE FINANCE
4. Facilitating Venture Capital
Although venture capital investments currently total several billion
dollars, they remain only a small fraction of all corporate financing.21'
Venture capital does not even supply equity for most close corporations.
Instead, friends and relatives provide such funds.212 These sources are
appropriate for small enterprises, but inadequate for larger companies,
especially those capable of rapid growth. For larger companies, either
venture capital or public financing is necessary. Not only is public fi-
nancing unavailable to many growing companies, it is also, according to
Michael Jensen, inherently inefficient and doomed to be eclipsed. 213 Is
venture capital, then, the financial wave of the future for growing
companies?
Jensen made his prediction for public financing when many major
companies were going private in highly publicized LBOs. Now, how-
ever, the LBO wave has crested, principally for two reasons. First, high-
yield bonds ("junk bonds") that financed many LBOs have fallen into
disrepute.214 Second, many LBOs were triggered by the fear of hostile
takeovers. This fear has now subsided. State courts upheld poison pills
and other defenses that made hostile takeovers difficult or impossible,
209. See supra note 172.
210. The difficulties in prohibiting abuses of corporate opportunities include: (1) defining corpo-
rate opportunities; (2) proving abuse of proprietary information; (3) proving the amount of monetary
damages, and (4) the limited enforcement of non-competition agreements. See supra notes 107-10
and accompanying text.
211. Nonfinancial, nonfarm capital expenditures totaled $380 billion in 1988; new venture capi-
tal investment averages about three billion dollars per year. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 475, 482.
212. The principal sources of close corporation financing are sometimes called the three F's-
family, friends and fools.
213. Jensen, supra note 7.
214. See Roger Lowenstein, Junk Gets Junkier, and that May Explain Bonds' Current Ills,
WALL ST J., Nov. 3, 1989, at CI. More recently the junk bond market has revived somewhat. See
William Goodwin, Junk Bond Rebirth May Spur Buyouts, Some Experts Say, Am. BANKER., Apr. 6,
lqq2, at 16.
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and state legislatures enacted further obstacles to tender offers.2"-
Although the tide of LBOs has ebbed,216 Jensen's insight remains persua-
sive. Public equity financing has many flaws which are best articulated
by the phrase "separation of ownership and control. ' 217 The decline of
LBOs stems from a hostile economic and legal climate; it does not indi-
cate the superiority of public equity financing.
Why, then, is venture capital not more common? One reason is the
high transaction costs, which render small venture capital investments
impractical.21 Investments that are large enough to overcome high
transaction costs can be made only by wealthy individuals or by institu-
tions that pool capital from many people. In the latter case, this pooling
further increases the transaction costs of venture capital arrangements.
These costs put venture capital out of reach for firms needing smaller
sums of money. Even firms that could raise venture capital are forced to
examine other sources of financing21 9 or forego financing more often than
they would if the transaction costs of venture capital were lower. The
hypothetical bargaining model220 suggests how to lower these costs and
thus facilitate venture capital financings-the law could provide default
rules which most parties would adopt if they were able to negotiate with-
out any costs. Terms that are typical in venture capital financings could
be used to satisfy this model and could be applied unless the parties
otherwise agreed. This would reduce the costs of negotiating individual
financing arrangements.
Some objections to this approach can be anticipated. First, venture
capital covenants vary so that determining the default rule is difficult.
This objection, though valid, should not preclude the effort. Corporate
law already supplies default rules for investors. The only question is
whether better default rules can be designed. A more serious problem is
that terms that are typical in venture capital arrangements are not always
appropriate in other contexts. A good example is the common venture
215. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 550-51,
556-58 (1990).
216. See supra note 8.
217. See Dent, supra note 43, at 881.
218. One publication suggested $500,000 as the minimum practical venture capital investment.
KOZMETSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at 3. See also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 160, at 38
n.121.
219. Although venture capital generally represents the owner-managers' last choice for raising
capital, there are exceptions. See supra text accompanying note 16.
220. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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capital provision that allows the investor to elect half of the company's
directors. This provision makes sense when an investor supplies substan-
tial capital and receives a significant portion of the equity. It is not feasi-
ble when an investor receives only a small part of the company's equity.
One response to this objection is that only default rules are at issue;
parties could still freely negotiate their own terms, customizing them to
fit their situation and preferences. For example, a small shareholder
could agree to elect only a minority (or none) of the directors. By requir-
ing the small shareholder's consent, the new default rules would
strengthen the bargaining position of minority investors, who often fail to
appreciate how powerless and vulnerable they will be. However, if typi-
cal venture capital terms diverge even more than the current default rules
do from what most parties want, adopting such terms as the new default
rules would be a step backward. If more divergent default rules were
adopted then most parties would incur higher transaction costs to adopt
the rules they wanted. This would inhibit rather than promote the fi-
nancing of small businesses.
Perhaps a prudent compromise would be to establish a set of typical
venture capital terms which entrepreneurs could adopt or reject in toto.
For example, a special statute could apply to each close corporation un-
less it opted out.2 21 Unless otherwise agreed, traditional corporate law
default rules would govern those close corporations opting out of the
special statute. Under this compromise approach, the parties would not
have to contract separately out of each venture capital term; they could
avoid them all at once. Alternatively, the special statute could be
designed as an opt-in type, applying only to companies that expressly
elected it.222 However, this approach requires that an investor (or his
counsel) be sophisticated enough to make the necessary election. Many
states already have opt-in codes for close corporations, but they are sel-
dom used because either investors have unsophisticated counsel (or no
counsel at all) or their counsel does not consider these codes
advantageous.223
Legislatures have addressed the issue of venture capital in an attempt
221. There are many examples of opt-out statutes. For instance, Delaware corporations may opt
out of that state's antitakeover statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (1991). To avoid unfair
surprise to minority shareholders, states could require disclosure as a condition to opting out.
222. There are many examples. For instance, Delaware has a special close corporation sub-
chapter that applies only to those companies that elect to be governed by it. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 342 (1991).
223. See I F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND
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to make such financing less burdensome. For example, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 was amended in 1980224 to ease its burden on
venture capital firms. However, further legislative reform is desirable.225
Legal change is not limited to legislation; courts can also help protect
investors. Most investors know little about corporate law. Yet, justly
fearing exploitation, they shun investments in close corporations. In re-
cent years courts have provided minority investors more protection from
exploitation;226 this trend should continue. Judicial protection of inves-
tors is inherently limited, though. It requires litigation, which is unpre-
dictable and is too expensive unless the minority's investment is
substantial and the defendants' behavior truly egregious.
The bar can also help protect minority investors. The problems of
high transaction costs and unsatisfactory results occur most often when
uninformed lawyers draft financing agreements from scratch. When, as
often happens, one lawyer is experienced and the other is not, the latter's
client is likely to get a bad bargain.227 As in other areas of the law, the
bar can assist by educating potential clients about the importance of re-
taining effective counsel and by identifying experienced counsel.
Beyond this, the bar could publish model or standard form investment
contracts. The bar has prepared model forms for other corporate trans-
actions, such as the American Bar Association's Model Trust Inden-
ture.228  A model contract has some of the limitations of an opt-in
statute-it is useful only when lawyers have the knowledge to use it.
Even then, it helps only if it is appropriate for the deal. Because deals
vary widely, standard form contracts often need modifications. How-
ever, this problem is inevitable-the law always provides default rules.
PRACTICE § 1.18 (3d ed. 1986); Dennis S. Karjala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation
Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1266 n.236 (1981).
224. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-53 to 80a-64 (1976), as amended by Small Business Investment Company
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275.
225. See IV TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 263-64 (1980) (dis-
cussing the Small Business Investment Company Act's conflicting goals).
226. See Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981) (ordering payment of
dividends); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that judicial dissolu-
tions are always subject to a party's right to buy out the other party on court approved terms). See
also supra note 155.
227. Venture capitalists generally retain better lawyers than managers because, as repeat players,
they better appreciate the importance of good counsel and know better whom to retain. In other
types of equity investments in close corporations, however, the managers are generally more sophis-
ticated and better represented than the investors.
228. See MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS (Am. Bar Found. 1965).
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The question is not whether a model contract will fit all cases-clearly it
cannot-but whether it can improve existing law for a broad range of
transactions.
A model contract would have advantages over a statute. Drafters can
more easily amend a model contract in light of experience. The model
contract could also more easily offer the parties alternative clauses and
comments explaining how different terms should be used and judicially
interpreted. The bar could also educate lawyers about a model contract's
existence and uses.
B. The Limits of Private Equity Financing
Although legal changes can facilitate venture capital and other minor-
ity equity investments in close corporations, this form of financing has
some limits. Better default rules may lower the cost of negotiating in-
vestment contracts, but the need for customized terms will often restrict
the savings. Moreover, many costs of investing arise not from negotiat-
ing terms, but from the investor's investigation of the company's business
prospects and the company's need to cooperate by supplying information
to the potential investor. Legal changes will not reduce these costs.
Venture capital financing is also restricted by liquidity problems. Iron-
ically, although venture capital is an alternative to public financing, ven-
ture capitalists typically invest only in companies that they expect will
eventually go public-so that they can cash in their investment. Venture
capitalists would, therefore, approve measures that would make it easier
to go public. However, such measures would eventually make venture
capital financing less common because companies would bypass venture
capital financing altogether and go straight to public financing.
Easing restrictions on private sales of shares in close corporations
would also relieve the liquidity problem. Toward that end, the SEC
adopted Rule 144A. 29 Yet, the prospect of further relief is doubtful. A
market for private resales will significantly help investors in close corpo-
rations only if it approaches the liquidity of a public trading market. The
SEC, however, allows companies to be publicly traded only if they regu-
larly disclose full financial information.230 This requirement is needed to
protect investors, but it prohibits companies from publicly trading their
stock (and thereby solving their shareholders' liquidity problem) without
229. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
230. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1992).
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incurring the high costs of regular public disclosure.23 t
The liquidity problem also confines the field of potential investors in
close corporations. Investors expect to eventually sell their shares.
Although institutional investors can often wait many years to sell, few
individuals will commit to such a long wait. Unexpected events in their
lives often compel individuals to quickly sell their investments. The pos-
sibility of such exigencies may preclude many individuals from investing
in a close corporation. Nonetheless, many individuals will make long-
term investments, especially if they will not soon need the amount they
invested and if a market exists for the investment in case of the need to
sell.
Although illiquidity is the immediate problem of investors, it also indi-
rectly harms managers. One drawback of venture capital financing is
that venturers demand higher rates of return than public investors.232
Illiquidity is one reason for this demand.233 Hence, if the law can en-
hance liquidity of investments in close corporations, it will also decrease
the cost (and increase the appeal) of private financing. Another reason
why venture capitalists demand higher returns on their investments is
their lack of diversity.234 Because they are undiversified, venture capital-
ists' portfolios are riskier. To compensate, they demand higher invest-
ment returns: Unlike the liquidity issue, the law can do little to
ameliorate this problem.
In sum, the law can take some steps to facilitate private equity financ-
ing, but most of the problems of such financing are partly or entirely
immune to legal correction.
C. The Future of Corporate Finance
Despite the limitations of venture capital financing, Michael Jensen's
prediction that in the future private equity financing will grow at the
expense of public financing is correct.235 The forces that have curbed
LBOs are not permanent; LBOs could revive and the obstacles to unso-
licited takeovers could erode or be circumvented by raiders. Moreover,
231. See supra note 16 (discussing these costs).
232. See supra notes 15, 23.
233. See supra note 23.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
235.- See Bevis Longstreth, Takeovers, Corporate Governance, and Stock Ownership: Some Dis-
quieting Trends, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 54, 58 (Spring 1990) ("Institutional investors are increasingly
turning to non-public investments.").
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LBOs are not always junk-bond financed and designed to forestall hostile
takeovers. LBOs persist because of certain disadvantages of public fi-
nancing-in particular, the tendency of stock markets to undervalue
public companies236 and the disclosure and other costs associated with
public company status.
Further, private equity financing is not used only for LBOs-i.e., tak-
ing public companies private. It is principally used to finance companies
that never have been public and that cannot or prefer not to seek imme-
diate public financing. Private equity financing is also used by public
23companies. 7 Although the equity in LBOs in some ways resembles ven-
ture capital, most venture capital financing is not highly leveraged. It
does not depend on simultaneous debt financing, and thus was not in-
jured by the crash of the junk bond market. In addition, because venture
capital financing is not a vehicle to avoid hostile takeovers, it has not
suffered from the decline of hostile takeovers.
The central question, then, is which form of financing is superior.
Public and private financing both have advantages and disadvantages
that cannot be weighed precisely. It is difficult to determine the extent of
private financing under an ideal legal system-even describing such a
system is difficult. Moreover, the appeal of private financing depends on
the flaws of public financing. Those flaws may grow or diminish in the
future. Private financing will never supplant, and perhaps never surpass,
public financing. Yet, private financing may well expand in future de-
cades, especially if its treatment by the legal system improves. Such a
development would profit both entrepreneurs who seek capital and inves-
tors, and thus the entire economy.
236. This phenomenon reflects the separation of ownership and control. See Kraakman, supra
note 2. Thus, underpricing creates an incentive for an LBO and may also induce an unsolicited
tender offer, which further sharpens the incentive for an LBO.
237. See, eg., Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 34 (discussing a major equity investment in
Turner Broadcasting by a consortium of cable television companies).
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